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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

LOGICAL POSITIVISM, CRITICAL IDEALISM, AND THE CONCEPT OF MAN

I

THIS paper, in its widest import, is concerned with the present schism in philosophy between those who assert and those who deny the validity of metaphysics. This schism is assuming disastrous proportions, and the reconciliation of the parties to the dispute is the necessary condition for constructive coöperation in philosophy.

With this general end in mind, the paper is particularly addressed to that whole contemporary intellectual movement that is avowedly anti-metaphysical and anti-speculative. This movement, far from being unified, comprises a variety of schools that are in disagreement on many points; so any specification of it, by either intension or extension, is difficult and tenuous. But it looms so large on the philosophic horizon that it hardly requires to be identified. Extensively, it might be said to stretch from the physicalism of Otto Neurath to the fictionalism of Hans Vaihinger; and it would probably be agreed that the dominant strains within the movement are critical idealism, as exemplified by Ernst Cassirer, and the logical positivism (or logical empiricism) that originated with the Vienna Circle. Intensively, it is characterized by its insistences that the field and function of philosophy must be drastically purged and re-assessed; by its concentration upon problems of scientific methodology and semantic analysis; by its limitation of empirical verifiability to those propositions that refer, directly or indirectly, to an immediate sensuous content given in experience; and by the tight restrictions that it places upon meaningful discourse and inquiry. In sum, the spirit of the movement is defined by its denial that knowledge can reach the metaphysical and normative issues that have always previously constituted the special concern of philosophy.

It is unnecessary to emphasize the contributions that have been made by the various individuals and schools who comprise this movement: the value of their work is attested and acknowledged. What is more immediately pertinent is the confusion and conflict that they have engendered by their strictures upon philosophic

speculation: that is, by their insistence that many of the problems that loom most importunately in human life are merely pseudo-problems, incapable of resolution, and that many of the propositions that appear to men as most significant are really meaningless. The effect of this has been to deny problems instead of investigating them, and to reduce the universe that man can know from a status of intelligibility to one of arbitrariness.

It is the central contention of the present essay that this drastic limitation of the reach of inquiry is unempirical and unscientific. In support of this contention, I shall first show that this procedure of systematically restricting knowledge is necessarily based upon certain assumptions, rarely acknowledged and never examined, concerning the character of man and of man's relation to the world. I shall make these controlling assumptions explicit and shall examine them in some detail, with special reference to their occurrence in the schools of critical idealism and logical positivism. Finally, I shall undertake to establish that these assumptions—these concepts of man's nature and status—are directly contradicted by all contemporary scientific theories of man; and particularly by the evidence of man's evolution, which is the best attested of all general facts concerning man. If all of this can be substantiated, then the adherents of this doctrine should be prepared to broaden their position, and the reconciliation mentioned above would be considerably furthered.

II

Behind every metaphysical doctrine there lies a theory of man. Any interpretation of the cosmos presupposes a human nature equipped to know this cosmos, after some fashion and to some degree. These are simple and obvious statements. The only point that needs to be stressed is that they apply as well to those who deny metaphysics as to those who practice it. The denial to man of any understanding of the total scheme of things, and the sharp curtailment of his acquaintance with the details of this scheme, entail a quite definite attitude toward man's place within the cosmos. This attitude in turn depends upon assumptions concerning the sort of creature that man is and the relations that hold between man and the environment that sustains him.

Philosophers have long acknowledged this truth, that their attempts to know the universe can be validated only by a certificate of man's ability as a knower. And the development of western philosophy has rested upon the explicit postulate that man is intimately connected with the order of nature—with the total scheme of things—in such a manner that knowledge of this order is one of his natural functions. This postulate receives succinct statement in

the proposition that man is a rational animal. It is the common acceptance of this thesis, and of the implications that flow from it, that constitutes the credo of western thought and binds its special and divergent schools into a coherent tradition.

When this tradition defines man as "rational animal," reason is not regarded as a character that is private to man: it is one that he shares with the universe. So man is, in essence, united with the objective order: his nature derives from this, and hence affords him access to it. This conception is thus immediately expandable into three major tenets: that the universe exhibits systematic order and connection; that man is a coherent part of the universe; that thought, utilizing the data of experience and the procedures of logic, can realize the knowledge that is implicit in the structure of the universe and so achieve understanding.

It is, I think, precisely at this point that the contemporary anti-metaphysical movement has diverged from the classical tradition. It is perfectly apparent, and has often been noted, that the position of these schools derives from a drastic revision of the classical doctrines concerning the character, the conditions, and the limits of human inquiry. It is my argument that this revision itself derives from a prior and even more drastic change in the conception of man. It is this new concept of man, unrecognized and unexamined, that operates to define the course and the content of the modern schools. It is now time to elaborate this argument: first, by making explicit and analyzing the new interpretation of man; then by showing that this interpretation does violence to the most firmly grounded hypotheses of the empirical sciences of man.

III

This new concept of man, in the very fact that it serves as the common assumption and point of departure for such diverse schools, must be expected to be a broad and general one: it states an attitude rather than a definition, a program rather than a body of doctrine. But its central character can still be clearly discerned and simply expressed: *man is an animal who arbitrarily and wilfully creates his world out of his own resources.* If we take the term "language," as is now usual, to include all of the modes in which man systematically expresses himself, we can arrive at a briefer formula: *man is a linguistic animal.* The essence of man's character is now found in his ability to impose form and order upon the inherently chaotic material of primitive awareness. The theme of man's life is now found in his continuing effort to express himself more exactly and completely.

As here conceived, man does not, because he can not, explore and know an objective world. He can and does synthesize and project a plurality of worlds that are constructs of his own subjective resources. These resources are, in broad terms, the data of sense, the impulsions of emotion, and the process of mind. These three together constitute the elemental endowment of the human psyche; they are the stuff the psyche has to work with. Furthermore, and this point needs to be stressed, they are an endowment that is strictly intrinsic to the psyche: they are not bestowed on the psyche by an external agent—such as God or Spirit—nor does the psyche derive them from its commerce with any extrinsic source, such as the physical universe or the Realm of Forms. The modern schools are at one in their refusal to refer man's psychic resources to any extra-human principles. The data of sense, the impulsions of emotion, and the processes of mind are elements in the strict sense: they themselves neither require nor permit any further explanation, and it is solely in terms of them that all the phenomena of human nature and behavior are to be explained. Conceived now as a linguistic animal, man has ceased to be merely the center of things, and has become the whole of things.

The influence of this concept of man is clearly evidenced in the manner in which the adherents of criticism and analysis conduct their inquiries into human phenomena. The essence of this methodology can be briefly stated: the new schools investigate man in utter isolation from the total environment in which he lives and acts. They apparently feel no need to inquire into either the origin or the destiny of man; they do not seek to place him within a larger scheme of things; nor do they envisage him as reflecting any order of existence other than his own. Where this method is strictly applied, its effect is to put man in a complete vacuum, both metaphysical and epistemological: he sustains no pertinent connections with an external reality, and he can have no acquaintance with anything beyond his own character and activities. Man must be investigated strictly and solely in terms of himself—of what he experiences and what he does. Where the method is applied with less self-consciousness and more common sense, it admits man's commerce with the universe, but only under very special terms. Man is still not regarded as having any proper place within the world, nor any natural affinity with the environment: he is treated as a stranger and visitor to nature. Hence, a study of nature can shed no light on man; and man's ability to know nature is precarious and limited.

All of this is to say that the new schools view man's presence in the world as an unimportant accident. Since man is now become

by definition a linguistic animal, interest is confined to the modes in which he expresses himself and the conditions which permit him to carry on discourse. Man's dependence upon the world is ignored; the fact that his character and behavior must be patterned to the environment is forgotten; and the demands that life imposes upon him are treated as trivial. In sum, man is no longer regarded as a creature, but as a creator. He has ceased to be a dependent but integral part of an inclusive and coherent system; and he has become the absolute and arbitrary lord of a domain that is exclusive to him and that knows no law other than that which he chooses to give it.

It is my thesis that this concept of man is the controlling assumption of all the modern anti-metaphysicals, and particularly of critical idealism and logical positivism, which are otherwise so diverse. But it is certainly the case that this central concept is largely unrecognized and undeveloped by them. So it is necessary to examine briefly the specific doctrines of these schools, both to establish the presence and influence of this concept, and to analyze it more closely.

Since Ernst Cassirer climaxed his philosophic career with an *Essay on Man,* the task with respect to critical idealism is relatively simple. Cassirer bases his study of man upon the insistence that "we cannot define man by any inherent principle which constitutes his metaphysical essence—nor can we define him by any inborn faculty or instinct that may be ascertained by empirical observation." And he continues more positively: "man's outstanding characteristic, his distinguishing mark, is not his metaphysical or physical nature—but his work."[1] This seems an admirably realistic approach, and prepares us for a fully empirical inquiry that will take into account all of the factors that bear upon man to make him what he is and all of the modes of activity through which he accomplishes his work. But Cassirer pursues a far more restricted course than this. He has already ruled out biology, psychology, sociology, and history as fruitful supports for the understanding of man; even if these were completely realized disciplines, they would still leave us only in "the precincts of the properly 'human' world."[2] He has oversimplified, misinterpreted, and scorned the doctrines of evolution, psychoanalysis, economic—or any other—determinism, and religious salvation. In sum, Cassirer systematically rejects all of the various avenues of inquiry that have sought to understand man by reference to forces or conditions that lie outside of man. In the sentences immediately following those quoted above, he

[1] *An Essay on Man,* New Haven (Yale University Press), 1944, p. 68.
[2] *Ibid.*

states his thesis in this way: "It is this work, it is the system of human activities, which defines and determines the circle of 'humanity.' Language, myth, religion, art, science, history are the constituents, the various sectors of this circle. A 'philosophy of man' would therefore be a philosophy which would give us insight into the fundamental structure of each of these human activities, and which at the same time would enable us to understand them as an organic whole." [3]

Cassirer's inquiry is thus self-condemned to move in a tight circle. The fact that his argument moves in a circle is not readily apparent, because it is embellished with a tremendous wealth of empirical material and rational organization; and this circularity is not even especially vicious, because the tracing of it by Cassirer affords us a rich and minute acquaintance with human history and development. But the inquiry is circular, and never moves beyond man himself. This becomes evident as soon as we disentangle the skeleton of his argument; laid bare, it takes this form:

Man's nature (humanity) is equivalent to man's work.

Man's work is exhibited as a system of activities (language, myth, art, etc.).

This system of activities "defines and determines" man's nature (humanity).

It is obvious that the only way an escape can be made from this circle is through a further exploration of the "system of activities" that summarizes man's work and expresses man's nature. Cassirer recognizes this, and intends to exploit the possibility it opens. The passage I have been quoting continues:

> Language, art, myth, religion are no isolated, random creations. They are held together by a common bond. But this bond is not a *vinculum substantiale*, as it was conceived and described in scholastic thought; it is rather a *vinculum functionale*. It is the basic function of speech, of myth, of art, of religion that we must seek far behind their innumerable shapes and utterances, and that in the last analysis we must attempt to trace back to a common origin.[4]

The question that Cassirer here proposes to track down and answer in the rest of the book has actually already been answered, and is pursued no further. This answer, of course, resides in the doctrine of man as *animal symbolicum*. It is the distinguishing characteristic of man that he has developed a "*symbolic system*" which constitutes "a new *dimension* of reality." Through this symbolic activity man creates the various forms of cultural life:

[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*

language, myth, art, religion, science. These cultural forms, once created, then constitute the primary environment in which man resides, and are the chief influence that conditions man. Through the operation of these forms, physical reality continually recedes, until man comes to live more and more exclusively in a symbolic universe.[5]

It is quite apparent in many passages of the *Essay on Man* that Cassirer is unhappy about the consequences of this doctrine. Though he is forced to the systematic theoretical conclusion that man can not escape himself and his own creations, he is still reluctant to accept it. He frequently slips into a realistic use of language, and speaks of man as exploring, knowing, and coming to grips with, an objective world. He refers over and over again to the "fundamental task," the "basic function," the "common end" that man pursues through the media of his cultural activities. But Cassirer never identifies the origin, the nature, or the function of man's activities in any terms save those of the symbolic forms in which these activities manifest themselves. And the inquiry concludes on this note:

> Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man's progressive self-liberation. Language, art, religion, science, are various phases in this process. In all of them man discovers and proves a new power—the power to build up a world of his own, an "ideal" world.[6]

Thus, Cassirer finds no escape from the "circle of humanity"; the utmost that he can do is extend his inquiry from the human individual to human culture. There is no egress from this latter to any broader environment that contains it, to any more fundamental forces that condition it. Man determines culture and culture determines man. And it must be so from the moment that Cassirer, in defining man as *animal symbolicum*, regards symbolizing as a characteristic that is altogether private to man. If that which defines man's essence is exclusive to man, then it necessarily excludes man from any relevant and significant connection with the objective order. This ineluctable conclusion, following from the concept of man with which Cassirer's critical idealism starts, can be starkly exhibited by again laying bare the skeleton of the argument:

Man is a symbolic animal.
Symbolic activity creates the forms of man's cultural life.
Culture is the process of man's self-development and self-expression.

[5] For this argument, cf. especially *op. cit.*, chap. II.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 228.

> This cultural process and its phases (art, science, etc.) constitute the universe in which man lives and acts.
>
> Man lives in a universe that he has himself created.

I think the logic of this argument is rigorous. In substituting "symbolic" for "rational" in the concept of man, and in defining the former as he does, Cassirer is inevitably led to segregate man from all objective influences and to elevate him to the rank of a creator *ex nihilo*. He is thus led to substitute man for reality, function for substance, phenomenology for metaphysics. And all of this culminates in a final substitution of history for philosophy: for in this context all that one can study is what man has done.

There is no document in the writings of the logical positivists, or of any of the other analysts, where the concept of man is discussed as systematically and thoroughly as in the work of Cassirer that I have been examining. The interests of these schools are almost exclusively methodological; their concern is with the formal structure of the sciences, not with the substantial entities that are the subject-matter of these sciences. This means that in the human context they will talk at great length about "psychology," but not at all about "man."[7] This being the case, the concept of man that underlies the work of the logical positivists has entirely the status of an implicit assumption, and must be read out of whatever explicit consideration they give to human phenomena. The range of human behavior and the types of human artifacts upon which they concentrate attention should already disclose what they regard as the essence of man; the way in which they interpret such behavior and such artifacts should specify this definition rather closely.

Following this method, man-as-conceived-by-logical-positivism is readily evoked. This conception is never baldly summarized in so neat a formula as Cassirer's *animal symbolicum*. But a similar formula is clearly present and operative: man is a scientific animal. The only type of human behavior to which the logical positivists pay any heed is *inquiry;* the only type of human artifact with which they are concerned is *knowledge*. Taken together, these two constitute *science;* or, more exactly, these are the aspects under which science exhibits itself. Inquiry is the procedure that science follows; knowledge is the result that science produces. When logical positivism talks about man, it always talks about one of

[7] For example, the recent *Readings in Philosophical Analysis* contains papers by Professors Carnap, Hempel, and Schlick on the nature of psychology as a science. It contains no paper that even touches on the nature of man as a being.

these two: it examines either the conditions of successful inquiry or the criteria of valid knowledge. Other modes of human behavior, such as emotional, moral, esthetic, religious, are treated as trivial or aberrant; and the corresponding types of human artifacts are held to have no verifiable objective meaning and so no place in an ordered life.

Since the logical positivists regard science as the human activity *par excellence,* their exposition of the methods and the results of science affords a full and reliable insight into their interpretation of human nature. From the time that Plato first expressed it, the proposition that "Being is Power" has been accepted as a commonplace. A thing is what it does. Man practices science. So the character and capacities of man are measured by his procedures and accomplishments as a scientist.

The most direct approach to the positivists' theory of science is through their doctrine of the proposition. This doctrine is of central importance, since man discloses his character in his use of propositions; but it can be summarized quite briefly. The most significant fact about propositions is that they fall into two classes: they are either synthetic or analytic. Synthetic propositions, which make up the body of the natural sciences, are *empirical:* they are derived from experience; they have a factual content; they are provisional or hypothetical; and their validity is determined by an appeal to the facts of experience. Analytic propositions, which constitute logic and mathematics, are *a priori:* even though perhaps at least partially derived from experience (the logical positivists are unsettled, both individually and collectively, on this point, hence this clumsy expression), they make assertions that surpass the range of experience; they are formal statements of the ways in which words and ideas must be combined, and make no factual reference; they are necessary and certain; and their validity is determined solely by the definitions of the symbols and operations they contain. As A. J. Ayer has said, these two types of propositions correspond respectively to Hume's division of propositions into those that concern "matters of fact" and those that concern "relations of ideas."[8]

Man's essential capacity—his functioning as a scientist—is exhausted in uttering propositions of these two types. So the positivistic concept of man can be fully realized by an analysis of the character and the limitations of such propositions: since these constitute the substantial body of what man does, they exhibit the central core of what man is.

[8] A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic,* New York (Oxford University Press), 1936, p. 11.

The defining characteristic of synthetic, or factual, propositions is that they always refer to a content that is, or might be, actually given in experience. Their origin is empirical, their function is to anticipate future experience, and their validity is determined by an appeal to their experienced consequences. This, of course, amounts simply to a statement of traditional empiricism. But positivism defines the character of such propositions more closely by a rigid determination of what constitutes "experience." Experience, as the basis of valid synthetic propositions, is always and only sense-experience. It is only the data of sense that are sufficiently clear and constant to serve as a guide to the external world and as a ground for statements that can be publicly validated. Thus, Ayer distinguishes between the experience of a yellow object and the experience of God, and says they are quite distinct types of experience, because the former is concerned with a "sense-content" that can be "empirically verified," while the latter is not.[9] And he correspondingly delimits the proper function of synthetic propositions by saying that "they are designed to enable us to anticipate the course of our sensations."[10] The effect of this doctrine is to drastically limit man's reliable acquaintance with the world, and his legitimate discourse with his fellows. It asserts that, out of the whole panorama of experience, only sense-data permit man to establish a meaningful connection with anything beyond himself.

The distinguishing characteristic of analytic, or *a priori*, propositions is that they are always tautologies that elucidate the definitions of terms. They neither "make any assertion about the empirical world" nor "provide any information about any matter of fact."[11] They are the expressions of a conventional agreement to employ words in a certain way. In short, they are rules that govern the meanings of symbols and the uses of language. Thus, both physical and psychological considerations are irrelevant to analytic propositions. The systems of discourse that contain these propositions—i.e., logic and mathematics—are "not concerned with the properties of men's minds, much less with the properties of material objects."[12] These disciplines are purely formal: their course is uninfluenced by empirical content, and their results are independent of matters of fact. The effect of this doctrine is to completely isolate human reason, both from the natural environment and from the complex of human needs and purposes. The

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 181–182.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 139.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 114 and 104.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

processes of thought are logical and mathematical; if logic and mathematics are merely conventional, if they are in no sense patterned upon either the structure of the mind or the structure of the world, then the applicability of thought to things is either a myth or a mystery.[13] For this doctrine asserts that the methods of deductive reasoning establish connections only between man's ideas, not between these ideas and anything else.

We can now summarize this argument, and so bring into sharp focus the positivistic concept of man. Science is the essential activity and product of man. Science is composed of synthetic and analytic propositions. So man's intrinsic character, and his relations with the objective order, are revealed in the properties of these propositions. Analytic propositions are the expressions of definitions and rules that man has arbitrarily enunciated; they neither reflect nor establish any connections between man and the external world. Synthetic propositions deal only with such empirical facts as are given in sense-data; the connections that they permit among men, and between men and things, are restricted to the reach of sensation. So man's relations with his surroundings are a mixture of the tenuous and the arbitrary. For reasons that are never made clear, a certain small segment of experience—sensation—is vouched for as a reliable guide to matters of fact, while all the rest of experience is condemned as subjective and erratic. And for no reasons whatsoever, the procedures of formal reasoning are held to be relevant and useful in our dealings with matters of fact, though these procedures are defined as sheer conventions that man has elaborated in order to facilitate discourse. The logical anomalies of this position have been examined by others who are far more expert than myself in such matters;[14] and my present concern is not with the subtleties of the doctrine, but with the general interpretation of man that lies behind and supports it. This, I think, should now be clear. Positivistic man is a being who catches but a brief and shallow glimpse of the world, and then retires within himself to develop a system of ideas that will allow him to anticipate his future glimpses. This system of ideas then combines the seemingly irreconcilable properties of being both

[13] This argument has been interestingly developed by Ernest Nagel in an article, "Logic without Ontology," in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, ed. by Y. H. Krikorian, New York (Columbia University Press), 1944, pp. 210–241; and by H. R. Smart, "What is Deduction?," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. V (1944), pp. 37–49.

[14] Cf. articles cited in footnote 13. Also Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought*, Vol. II, Chap. XXX; and C. I. Lewis, "Experience and Meaning," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XLIII (1934), pp. 125–146.

arbitrarily constructed and pragmatically effective. How this miracle comes to pass is never explained. But its passage must be an integral part of positivist doctrine: it follows from their implicit definition of man as a scientific animal, coupled with their very explicit analysis of science. What I am here asserting to be the necessary course and consequence of the positivist doctrine can be made most explicit by a schematic presentation:

Man practices scientific inquiry.

Inquiry is capable of reaching conclusions that are both valid and fruitful.

For these conclusions to be valid, they must depend upon symbols and procedures that are arbitrary and *a priori*.

For these conclusions to be fruitful, they must have a reference to empirical matters of fact.

So the conclusions of inquiry—scientific knowledge—must be subjectively determined and yet objectively relevant.

Therefore, man is a being who himself creates the world that he knows. Again, I think that the logic of this argument is rigorous.

The fundamental coincidence of the views of logical positivism and critical idealism, which I claimed earlier, should now be manifest. The concept of man must be central to both of these schools —as to any other—and this concept is essentially identical in the two cases. For the analysts, inquiry replaces symbolism as the process through which man expresses his essential capacities. Knowledge replaces symbolic forms as the instrument that man employs in creating his world. The universe of science replaces that of culture as the environment in which man lives and realizes himself. The change is not very great. In both cases, man is held to create his world out of his own resources; he is treated as, at best, a trespasser within nature; he is endowed with the power to impose his conditions upon the environment that contains him. In sum, man is conceived as a being who is utterly independent, and so sustains no vital connections with anything beyond himself.

IV

My analysis so far has been intended to substantiate one simple but significant thesis: that critical idealism and logical positivism, the two leading anti-metaphysical schools, have as their controlling assumption a concept of man that isolates man sharply from his surroundings. It is now my purpose to establish that this view of man is inadequate, artificial, and, most important, unempirical.

Every line of argument is necessarily based upon some assumptions. I have just been criticizing those which I think to be central, even though only implicit, in much modern philosophy. So now,

in proceeding to argue against this philosophy, it is but fair that I should make quite explicit the assumptions that are contained in my own argument. This can be done very briefly: I am assuming that man is a product of organic evolution. This basic statement can be expanded, again very briefly, in this way: I am assuming that organic evolution is a continuing process that has taken place and still does so; that man, as a species of organism, has been subject to this process; that man has become what he now is under the impact of this process; that the most effective way to understand the structure and function of man is through the demands that this process has placed upon him. Since man is a viable solution to the problem posed by evolution within an environment, therefore man's capacities and activities are means of satisfying the conditions of life and meeting the demands of adaptation.

I should at once obviate certain possible misunderstandings. I am not here proposing, nor even endorsing, any particular interpretation of evolution. Especially, I am not assuming any narrowly materialistic or mechanistic philosophy. I am leaving completely open and untouched the question of the forces and factors that are responsible for evolution and control its course. I presume, along with everyone else, that there are such forces and factors. But their identification is not necessary to my present enterprise. I think that a very wide variety of metaphysical systems can equally well accept and include the doctrine of evolution within their ambit. I think that any such system that pretends to be contemporary must accept this doctrine. This is not the place, and I am certainly not the person, to attempt any definitive interpretation or explanation of evolution. And, once again, the question of the precise nature of the evolutionary process, and of the causes that control it, is not important to my actual argument.

What is important is the fact that the process has taken place, and that man has been one issue of it. This is the assumption, supported by the overwhelming consensus of scientific opinion, that I am making. I am assuming that, whatever else man may be, he is a being who has evolved. I think that this is the most massive and substantial fact that is available concerning man. I shall now argue that this fact that man has evolved is sufficient to disprove the concept of man that is central to critical idealism and logical positivism. I shall keep the line of this argument as direct and brief as possible.

To say that man has evolved is to say that he has been successful in competition with other organisms for a place within the environment. All organisms are dependent upon the environment: they survive by exploiting the resources of the environment, and

by developing the resources that are potential within themselves; that is, as some biologists have put it, the prospecive functions of organism and environment are transformed into real functions.[15] This, in essence, is the dynamics of adaptation. The adaptive relationship, then, involves a continuing adjustment of the organism to its surroundings. In the immense process through which this relationship is established, threatened, dislocated, and reëstablished or abolished, changes occur in both the organism and the environment. Among the determinants of this process that are widely recognized to be important are: gene mutations, ecological changes, population shifts, and the pressure of selection. There might well be others. Evolution is the highly abstract name for the whole concourse of events that issues from the interaction of these determinants. Adaptation is the equally abstract name for the problem that their presence poses to living organisms—and, by extension, for the operations by which organisms solve this problem. Survival is the prize of a successful solution.

Since man has survived, it is a truism that he has achieved such a solution: that he has developed characteristics and modes of activity that permit him to adapt successfully. But important conclusions can be drawn from this truism. For this must mean that man's behavior is controlled by an apparatus—by structures and mechanisms—which assures that his behavior will be appropriate to the demands of the environment as well as to the needs of the organism. The activities in which man engages, the artifacts that he produces and uses, must be under the guidance of faculties and operations that are commensurate with the character of the environment in which man lives, and with the modes of adjustment that man employs. Which is simply to say that man's resources must be adequate to the conditions they have to satisfy.

Prominent among these human resources are the data of sense, the impulsions of emotion, and the processes of thought. Man does, as a matter of biological fact, rely heavily upon these three as instruments of adaptation. This reliance is not complete: instinct, reflex, and habit play their parts. But the process by which man adapts to the environment is largely a conscious one, and is carried out under the direction of sense, feeling, and thought. The transactions that man has with things in the environment usually take place within the context of what we call "experience": it is here that we apprehend the character of things, that we measure the

[15] This way of conceptualizing the matter, originated by A. E. Parr, is discussed, with reference to the sources, by G. G. Simpson in his stimulating and minutely documented book, *Tempo and Mode in Evolution*, New York (Columbia University Press), 1944, Chap. VI, esp. pp. 183–196.

import of things for us, and that we explore the temporal and spatial relations that hold among things. We do all of this through the operation of sense, feeling, and thought. These are the primary modes of experience which, intermingling constantly with one another, report to us the structure of the environment and guide the responses by which we adjust to the environment. That part of this welter of efferent and afferent transactions that enters consciousness, we call experience.

This means that experience is primarily an agent of adaptation. As biologists and neurologists assert with no hesitation, the higher centers of the nervous system, which support conscious experience, constitute man's unique mechanism for adjusting to the things that surround him. Among the more important capacities of these higher centers are sense, emotion, and thought. These capacities, whose operation is reflected in experience, must, then, be geared to the character and the demands of the environment. That is, it must be the case that sense, emotion, and thought—the central nervous system, if one prefers to think of the actual structure of which these are actual functions—afford us a relevant account of the external world and serve us as effective guides in our transactions with the things in this world. This important conclusion can be supported by two arguments, one based on matters of fact and one based on the necessities of the case. These can be stated briefly.

First, as to sheer matter of fact. Considered both structurally and functionally, man's central nervous system has been fashioned slowly and gradually in the course of evolutionary development. During this course, these higher centers have elaborated step by step the structure they now have; and concomitantly they have assumed a continually greater share in the direction of human behavior. So that now such psychic functions as perception, emotion, and thought clearly play a dominant rôle in the process of man's adaptation to the environment. The point to be stressed is that none of this has happened either suddenly or at random. The paleontological record is abundantly clear on this point: man as an organism and as a mode of adjustment develops gradually and in close contact with the environment. The evidence of modern genetics is just as emphatic in insisting that these structural and functional changes could not be the product of any gigantic mutation: they represent the gradual accumulation and spread of many small mutations that had selective value. Finally, neurology, relying partly upon the well established principle that "ontogeny repeats philogeny" and partly upon careful studies of comparative embryology, makes the same assertion. All of the empirical evi-

dence, carefully analyzed by scientists, points in the same direction: the neurological structure peculiar to man, and the functions that this structure supports, have evolved under the impact of environmental conditions and as a means of satisfying these conditions. They are instruments of adaptation that have proved singularly effective. This means that they are peculiarly sensitive to the character of the environment: they afford man a wider and more refined awareness of the environment, and an ability to respond accordingly.[16]

The argument from necessity flows directly out of these facts. Man's higher capacities are the functional aspect of the central nervous system. These capacities are the resources under whose direction man carries on the process of adaptation. That is, they constitute the specialized machinery through which the organism man meets the conditions of life-within-an-environment. So the operation of these capacities must be adequate to the conditions they meet.

This operation consists largely in amassing and organizing information about the environment. Human behavior, both as it appears in consciousness and as it is analyzed by the neurologist, depends heavily upon what we can gather concerning the things with which we have transactions—including among these things, of course, the human organism itself. Man adjusts to an environment that he quite purposefully explores by means of sense, emotion, and thought: from the data and conclusions that he thus draws, he forms a picture of surrounding circumstances and of what these circumstances demand of him. He then acts upon this information. This information, since action based upon it is successful, must be relevant to that of which it informs us: the character of the environment. And this must be equally true of all of the resources through which man receives this information. There is no justification for selecting some one, or more, of these as trustworthy, and for rejecting the other, or others. This point is obviously central, but I can not here pursue it. I can only insist upon it: sense, emotion, and thought are all equally instruments of adaptation; they all function as such by means of the information they supply about the character of the environment, both external and internal; they all depend upon a structure—the central nervous system—that has developed under selective pressure from the environment. Man relies—he acts—upon the information they supply. If they were unreliable, man

[16] This thesis has been admirably stated by C. J. Herrick, "Progressive Evolution," *Science*, Vol. 104 (1946), p. 469.

would not have survived. So it must be the case that they yield reliable reports of the character of things and the conditions of life.

These arguments enforce the same conclusion: man, as a whole organism, is a viable solution to the problem of adaptation. His structure and his functions are aspects of this solution: they have evolved under the impact of life-within-an-environment, as a means of carrying on the necessary transactions with the things that man encounters. In sum, man is a being who is dependent upon, conditioned by, and so intimately connected with, the total environment in which he lives and acts.

V

This conclusion directly contradicts the concept of man that, as I have shown, lies at the base of the modern critical and analytical schools. Since this conclusion is supported by absolutely all scientific studies of man, it merits acceptance as a well substantiated hypothesis. Its acceptance refutes the systematic doctrines of critical idealism and logical positivism, because it destroys the concept of man that is their central assumption. Though it leaves unquestioned the merit of many of their detailed analyses, and even, I think, affords a more correct hypothesis—a broadened concept of man—which will permit a great and valuable extension of their special techniques to fields that are badly in need of an examination that will be constructive as well as critical. And it is only reasonable to expect that these schools should themselves acknowledge this refutation, accept this hypothesis, and proceed with this work, since they place such confidence in the findings of empirical science.

The line of my argument against critical idealism and logical positivism can here be summed up briefly. These doctrines conceive man as independent of, unconditioned by, and unconnected with, the environment: this is the implicit assumption that is central and necessary to them. Logically derivative from this assumption, but actually more explicit and influential in the work of these schools, is a corresponding conception of experience. Attempting to practice a rigid empiricism, they conceive experience as an ultimate datum which neither makes nor permits any valid reference beyond itself. Experience as it occurs is compulsive; but none of the seeming contents of experience is included within this compulsion. This means that experience-as-an-occurrence has no reliable or meaningful reference to the things in the environment that it appears to report. And this means that experience-as-an-instrument has no necessary or relevant connection with the demands of the environment and the conditions of life. But this, as I have shown, is in flagrant contradiction with all the findings of the

various sciences, from neurology to paleontology, that concern themselves with man. So these doctrines do violence to the facts, and are refuted as theoretical interpretations of man and man's activities. The whole weight of this argument comes sharply to bear at one point. If man were the kind of being that these doctrines conceive him to be, he would never have been able to adapt and survive. The simple survival of man refutes the subtle logic of these schools.

There remains but one question, to be dealt with quite summarily. How did these schools come to build their acute and elaborate theoretical doctrines upon a foundation that is so factually unsound? The answer I would suggest is apparently perverse: I think they are blinded to the facts by the very empiricism that they so purposefully adopt. Empiricism clearly commits one to starting with experience. If this empirical outlook is at once sufficiently intense and sufficiently obstinate, it may then refuse to go beyond experience. Proclaiming that only experience is self-evident, it insists that there is no logically good reason to believe in the adequacy of the capacities—sense, emotion, and thought—whose operation is reflected in experience, and so no reason to accept the objective relevance of the reports that these capacities present as the "givens" of experience. Obsessed by the immediate presence of experience, these schools are reluctant to entertain anything that is mediate and derived. So they systematically maintain that all of man's intellectual products only "organize and synthesize" his experience, as with critical idealism; or they arbitrarily select certain of these products as having a limited objective reference and pragmatic relevance, as with logical positivism. Fascinated by the obviousness of experience, these schools have not thought to ask whence experience comes, how it occurs, what functions it performs, what purposes it serves.[17]

As a final means of clarifying both the historical contribution and the theoretical fallacy of these schools, I can only suggest an historical analogue. I think that what has been happening in the work of the contemporary critical and analytical movements is highly similar to what happened in the work of the Pre-Socratic philosophers from Thales to Leucippus. These latter, highly diverse in their specific doctrines, all shared an intense interest in

[17] This same point can be made in different terms, by reference to the source from which these philosophies derive their controlling views of the world and man. This source is almost exclusively the physical sciences. These schools have been so impressed by the physicist that experience becomes for them the data that he needs, and knowledge becomes the conclusions at which he arrives. This infatuation with physics has led them to ignore biology.

the character and structure of the natural world. This world was so obvious that it never occurred to them to question its being what it appeared to be. The distinction between the world as it is in itself and the world as given in experience entirely escaped them. In short, they completely overlooked the dependence of the world upon man. The anti-metaphysical schools have reversed this error. Diverse though they too be, they all share an intense interest in the character and structure of experience. Experience is so obvious that it does not occur to them that it has an origin, a history, and a function. They have forgotten that the obvious is not necessarily—nor even probably—the ultimate. So the distinction between experience as it is in itself and experience as an agent of the human organism has escaped them. They have ignored the facts that man not only *has* but *uses* experience; that man's experience must be adequate to its employment; that man uses experience as an instrument of adaptation. In short, they have completely overlooked the dependence of man upon the world.

At the very beginning of this essay I stressed the difficulty of satisfactorily identifying the movement comprised by these various groups. This historical analogue suggests a title which largely meets this difficulty: which indicates both the power and the limitations of this movement, and which serves to indicate its position in the total development of philosophical inquiry. I think the future will establish that the critical and analytic schools, taken as a whole, can most aptly be called the Neo-Pre-Socratics.

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BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF ART

THE recent attempts of Professor Susanne K. Langer and of Professor Charles Morris to apply a philosophy of symbolism or semiotics to art deserve a careful analysis. Basic to this treatment is the assumption that art forms are a subdivision of signs or symbols, linguistic or non-linguistic but still a species of signs among other signs. The distinction between signs and symbols is not very clearly established in these theories.

Mrs. Langer's theory is built around the concept of "presentational" (as against "discursive") symbolism while that of Professor Morris works (with qualifications) with the concept of "iconicity." Professor Morris adds the somewhat incongruous specification of the "appraisive-evaluative" aim of art, at least of poetry. But

he tries to integrate art signs into a general system of signs rejecting the Langerian dichotomy.

The difference between these two theories is not as great as it might seem. What is "iconic" can only be so by being "presentational" and what is "presentational" is presumably so by means of "iconicity."

But how about the basic assumptions? Can art objects really be termed "signs"? Does this square with the inherent function of art? And how about the crucial problem of poetic discourse in such a pattern? Certainly a basic distinction should be drawn between natural and artificial signs. We would then see that the main body of artificial signs is linguistic and even propositional in character. They form part of propositions. Other artificial signs are post-linguistic and merely derivative from and replaceable by and translatable into linguistic signs. Some rudiments of pre-linguistic signs still existing, such as gestures of all sorts, are unimportant and although Professor Morris disagrees with this theoretically, almost the whole of his book practically deals with linguistic signs. It is certainly far-fetched, to say the least, to look at a still life picturing two worn-out shoes (Van Gogh) and to say (as Professor Morris would) that this is a statement. What statement? "These are two old shoes" or an appraisal "I like two old shoes" or a prescription "You should wear such two old shoes"? Let us rather for our edification analyze the procedure of the artist.

Let there be a painter and an object "horse" *H*. Let the cluster of signs (propositions, ideas with a feeling tone, etc.) which arises in the mind of the painter as a result of his looking at the horse be *I* (images, ideas) and let the picture he paints as a result of these processes be *E* (effigy). What is the relationship between these three necessary components *H*, *I*, and *E*?

According to all theories that call *E* a sign, a direct relationship is construed between *E* and *H* such that *E* (effigy) is a sign of *H*. Just as the word "horse" denotes the object "horse," *E* is supposed to be a sign of *H*. Now if *E* were really directly related to *H* (as for instance is a photograph to its subject), it could be said that *E* is a sign of *H*, although with great reservations—because everybody agrees that a sign is not a copy or a duplicate. But if there were such direct relationship between *E* and *H*, logic would require that *E* denote or at least designate *H*, which is false, because if *E* denotes or designates anything, it can denote only *I*, to which it is directly related and from which it stems, not *H*.

The whole construction of the semanticists in question is faulty, however, because the artistic process is not a two-termed relationship between *H* and *E*, but a triadic one between *H*, *I*, and *E*, where *E*

is in direct relationship to *I* and not to *H*. In contradistinction to the usual relationship between sign and referent where *I* points directly to *H* and denotes it, the artistic activity is richer by one more member; it is three-termed.

I take it that *E* must also denote something and so it does, but this denotation does not point to the outside object *H*, but to the inside image and spoken or unspoken signs *I*. The direction of *E* is different from that of *I*. While *I* always points to the periphery (the external world), *E* points to the center, namely, *I* from which it came. By and in itself *E* is a second kind of external object, but an artificial one, one pointing toward the inside image *I* and explanatory of the latter.

If the creative individual is a painter, the *E* is a pictorial effigy of *I;* if he is a poet, then *E* is a poetic effigy of *I;* if he is a musician, then *E* is the musical effigy of *I;* if he is an architect, then *E* is the architectural effigy of *I;* if he is a sculptor, then *E* is the plastic effigy of *I;* if he is a choreographer, then *E* is the choreographic effigy of *I*. In the last instance *H* is not even clearly apparent and so it may often be in music, abstract painting, etc. although this is an illusion, because only the world symbolized here by *H* can create the level *I* of which *E* is the reaction and effect. All the propositional signs, etc., exist on the level *I;* the level *E* falls outside that scope. *E* has no independent status; it is a function of *I*, so that *I* is a prerequisite of *E*'s coming into being. The relation of *E* to *I* is that of an illustration to a text. It is impossible to express art in terms of signs, whether linguistic, after the procedure of Professor Morris, or non-linguistic, according to Mrs. Langer, who is forced to assume without justification two kinds of thought, a discursive and a presentational one. This procedure is really circular. In our times art is the only specimen of such non-discursive thought and the non-discursive thought is postulated just because art does not fit into the discursive one. While art is thus accorded on the one hand a higher status than it deserves, it is squeezed on the other hand into a too narrow framework of sign. Our cities are, as were ancient Rome or medieval Venice, nothing else than *E*, i.e., an illustration of a state of mind, but they are neither linguistic signs nor specimens of a lower, more primitive kind of thought (as Mrs. Langer would have it). All these structures are in fact post-linguistic, namely, dependent on the existence of a whole body of propositions varying according to culture.

There is no need to do violence to facts and to construe two kinds of thought or to invent pictorial statements and musical appraisals: the statements and the appraisals are in the mind of the artist and the artistic creations illustrate them. The fact that

we are able to read statements into a picture does not mean that a picture is a statement. One could look at the sepulchral monuments of the Medicis in Florence forever without ever knowing that one statue represents Giuliano dei Medici. One can know it only from other propositions: statements of Michelangelo and his contemporaries or from books that continue the tradition. This is the propositional prerequisite of the understanding of the monuments. One of the Pinturicchio frescoes in the Libreria of the Cathedral of Siena represents the betrothal of Emperor Frederic III to Eleonore of Portugal by Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini. To understand the picture, we must know from preëxisting propositions what a betrothal is, who Frederic was, etc. All of this propositional content is not in the picture, but the latter is an illustrational comment on all such propositions. *E* is in fact an externalized part of the mind—a comment on signs,—while the theories which would make signs of it, saying that *E* is a sign of *H*, are merely a reissue of the time-honored theory that art is an imitation of reality, this time an imitation in form of presentational or iconic signs. If a sign-user creates a new sign (which is exceptional), his procedure is different from that of an artist creating a non-pre-existent effigy *E*, which is the rule in art creation. If the sign-user is to evolve the symbol "dimension," he must have had three preëxistent concepts of length, breadth, and depth, necessary for the analysis of perceptual space. After having grasped the common properties of these three concepts, he invents a higher type of expression synthesizing the three expressions of a lower type. This logical procedure is totally absent from the artistic process and it is done entirely on the level *I*. It is here that a hierarchy of types develops. The creation of *E* is a new step non-existent in the so-called referential use of signs and it constitutes neither a lower nor a higher level of intellectual expression.

Those affirming that *E* is a sign of *H* might object on the ground that the painter uses *E* as a "model" (for instance, in portrait painting). But this is an illusion. The painter uses the "model" in order to refresh and strengthen his memory; it is a mnemotechnic device and nothing else. The purpose is not the mechanical translation of *H* into *E*, such as a photographic camera would make, and the result is a genuine intellectual achievement of a special sort. If one assumes that *E* is an iconic sign of *H*, one is inevitably driven into the position that iconicity (or the measure of "presentational" factors) is the standard of excellence. The more iconicity, the better the work. This is in contradiction to modern and many other kinds of art. But the position is changed if we say that *E* pictures some propositions in the mind of the

artist. Then we can understand why a work of Rodin is better than that of a copyist of realistic works. A poetic stanza is not a statement. It is not meant to prove or demonstrate anything and all the propositional background of the large body of erotic poetry varies little. But words used on the *E* level may form an effigy not of love itself but of what the author thinks about love. *E* proceeds genetically from *I* and *I* is complex and includes all the propositions of the artist about *H*. *E* in its turn may be called the reified (*dinglich*) effigy of the propositions under *I*. This cluster of propositions has a feeling tone about them and therefore sometimes there is talk of "feeling" or affectivity. *E* is really a thing, an artificial thing analogous to the technological machines which imitate the procedures of nature. *E* is the incarnation or embodiment of *I*, an effigy of propositions. It may be sometimes true that the psychological intention of the artist is to make out of *E* a duplicate of *H*, but what he does is not true to *H*, but true to *I*, that is, to what he thinks about *H*. This conversion of propositions into artistic things is the essence of the artistic process. Its purpose is not the creation of new signs but of things having the power of replacing the propositions. The purpose is therefore de-symbolization, i.e., reversal from sign to thing, the artificial thing that shows what the propositions under *I* are. But it is clear that there is no need for the reversal if there is no previous level *I* which forces the hands of the artist to take this step of reversion. The world of art is therefore a thing-like replica of the propositions *I*.

As a "thing" the artistic object as such can not constitute any step on the ascending order of linguistic types, but it does not mark any step downwards in this hierarchy; it marks rather a reversal of direction—back to material reality,—but the result is a man-made, artificial reality, a reality transformed through the passage through *I*. If degree of abstraction is a measure of intellectual achievement (and I think it is), then *E* would be a lower, not a higher, type of such achievement, although this does not determine its value for mankind and its needs.

If we want to talk about the world, we must use the portable library of signs replacing the actual things, because the world is not portable. Thus it makes sense to say that *I* is a replacement of things (objects, events) by signs. *E*, however, is a new replacement of the signs *I* by new things, the artistic ones, despite the fact that it is only an adjunct of *I*. The whole process may result in a quasi-reconstruction of *H* by means of *E* with a difference, however, because *E* bears the imprint of *I* and has its traits. But nevertheless the process is a reversal of the intellectual trend from abstraction back to material facts.

E is by no means without reference. It has an internal reference and its referent is *I*, while *I*'s referent is *H*. Therefore if we want to understand *E*, we must look to *I* for an interpretation. The explanation of *E* by *I* is the activity of the critic. If the artist has succeeded in embodying adequately *I* in *E*, his work is well done, and the measure of success with which this was done is the measure of the excellence of the work. Of course, *I* may also be interpreted by *H*, i.e., the events of which *I* is a sort of abbreviated notation. But *E* is neither a system of notation nor of abbreviation; it is rather an expansion and a development of *I*. But if *I* is to be incarnated by thing-like building materials, such materials can only be borrowed from *H*, because no others exist in the world.

E has not the transparency of the verbal sign and it can not be defined in terms of other verbal signs; it must be seen or heard. It can at the utmost be named like any other individual. The meaning of *I* is in *H*, but its embodiment or incarnation is in *E*. In other words, to make art is to find an embodiment for thought, not to think. The purpose of the operation is the de-symbolization of thought by a reversal to thing-like effigies. Thought may have a hierarchy of its own measured by the degree of abstraction; it has a meaning provided by the world and it may have in addition an embodiment in the things of art. Thus both the power of achievement of *E* and its ancillary status with regard to *I* is clearly indicated.

It was already made apparent that the transformation of the propositional complex *I* into a new object, that of art, presupposes the attainment and the existence of the intellectual level *I*, without which that reconversion would be unnecessary and unintelligible. There may be emotive (or affective) reasons (of moral, religious, etc., character), i.e., reasons of world view which set off the mechanism of that reconversion, but the resulting structure *E* as such is not "emotive" and can not be. It is an intellectual achievement *sui generis*, regressive in the sense that it uses material elements as the building materials of the new structure.

It may seem that it is most difficult to prove this reconversion in poetry and fiction, since they are composed of propositional material, namely, of verbal signs. If it is maintained that *E* is not a sign of *H*, but a thing-like embodiment of the propositions clustered around *I*, how then can the triadic relation between *H*—*I*—*E* be asserted for literature (poetry, fiction) as art if the direct relation of signification between *H* and *E* is generally denied for art? We find the answer to this problem in an analysis of the so-called figures of speech or forms of comparison apparent in the simile, the metaphor, the allegory, the poetic symbol, the parable, and even the

fable, all of which are based on a basically analogous mental operation.

It is not indispensable for the purpose at hand to go into the details of this analysis [1] of the so-called "figures of speech" or the crystallizations of poetic thinking, but it is necessary to show that the triadic relation of *H*, *I*, and *E* is present in them as in other art structures.

According to traditional rhetoric a comparison is analyzable into three components: the *primum*, *secundum*, and *tertium comparationis* (first, second, and third members of comparison). The *primum* is the object compared, the *secundum* the object with which it is compared, and the *tertium* consists of the common properties of the *primum* and the *secundum*.[2] The difference between the simile and the other poetic figures is in general such that one member of the simile (comparison) is not directly expressed but implied.

But in order to understand the whole process a basic distinction must be made between a realistic comparison and the poetic forms of comparison. And the following points must be stressed here:

(1) That the poetic comparison is not based on a realistic analogy. The latter may be a pseudo-metaphor and often a former metaphor intellectualized and deprived of its "poetic" content.

(2) That the real poetic comparison is based not on realistic similarity but the valuational equivalence of the *primum* and *secundum comparationis*.[3] The simile "thy lips are corals," for instance, is grounded in such an equivalence and not the similarity of the two objects. Otherwise "corals" could be replaced by "bricks."

(3) The poetic comparison is neither a statement of fact nor a logical statement, nor is it a linguistic transaction in the usual sense. It is not a proposition.

The most elaborate poetic comparison has the same structure as the simplest one. Thus Shakespeare's Sonnet 73

> That time of year thou may'st in me behold
> When yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang
> Upon those boughs which shake against the cold,
> Bare ruin'd choirs, where late the sweet birds sang.

means the following:

[1] For a fuller discussion see my article, "Analysis of the Poetic Simile," this JOURNAL, Vol. XXXVII (1940), pp. 209–217.

[2] A. Richards changed this nomenclature and speaks of vehicle and tenor without adding anything of importance.

[3] See also my article, "Language of Poetic and of Scientific Thought," this JOURNAL, Vol. XL (1943), pp. 421–435.

The poet compares himself with "that time of year" which is autumn "when yellow leaves or none or few," etc. This is not a proposition. There is no similarity between a man and a time of year, i.e., the *primum comparationis* (man) and "the time of year," i.e., the *secundum comparationis* or the symbolic object, but there is a valuational equivalence between these two for the human mind. In our terminology the *primum comparationis* is therefore *H*, the *secundum E*, and the *tertium* is *I*. The simile or metaphor, etc., are therefore genuine artistic structures where the symbolic object (*secundum comparationis*) is the artistic thing *E* of our initial example. The ideas formational of the value of *H*—the object of the *primum comparationis*, sometimes also called feeling or affectivity—are worked out on the level *I* and the result of this mental process is embodied in the *secundum comparationis E* which—as the symbolic object—incarnates those ideas. We have here a valuational equation of *H* and *E*, but no realistic equation. The step from *H* to *E* is not one of abstract typology—as when a concept is ranged within a class—but a transformation of the ideas of value into the incarnating "thing of value" *E*. Thus the poetic comparison runs the full cycle of the whole artistic process and is a paradigm of any artistic transaction—couched here in verbal terms without being linguistic or a proposition. *E* is the valuational illustration of *I*. If poetry were verbal and used words as signs (on the conventional level), then there would be nothing "poetic" about it. Its essence and impact on human minds would be utterly incomprehensible.

Apart from the comparison (in the widest sense) the use of the verbal tissue in poetry in the function of *E* is apparent when the words are ranged and selected in a "musical" way. If the verbal tissue were completely transformed into music, the transformation would be perfect. As it is, poetry attempts to approach this ideal by rhythm, rhyme, alliteration, assonance, and similar devices, i.e., by a selection and sequence of words such that the verbal tissue acquires the power of characterization of the meaning of the verbal sign and has the illustrative function and power of a painting characterizing the ideas of the painter. In poetry, therefore, in addition to functioning on the level *I*, the words function also on the level *E*, the ideal being that they be in their integrity "also *E*," which is impossible. But they have the value of musical metaphors. They possess apart from their denotational function as signs the additional denotation as incarnations of thought, i.e., as art objects.

This applies mainly to "lyrical" poetry, but fiction and drama viewed in their art function are no conventional linguistic transactions and are not composed of propositions. Rather are they "par-

adigmatic situations'' composed of subdivisions (scenes, events), which are also ''paradigmatic situations'' and not assertions. These situations function on the level *E* just as the *secundum comparationis;* they do not state but embody ideas. If, for instance, in *Henry VI* Queen Margaret dips her napkin in the blood of murdered Rutland, hands it over to his father York, challenging him to wipe his tears in the blood of his child, Shakespeare creates a paradigmatic situation such that actions and events alone portray Margaret (''she-wolf of France,'' ''tiger's heart wrapped in a woman's hide'') and are beyond that illustrative of the evil inherent in man. Just as the *secundum comparationis* is an illustration of the *primum,* this scene illustrates Shakespeare's thoughts about man. It is therefore the *E* of our scheme, while Shakespeare's ideas were worked out on the level *I,* and while *H* are some events in the world that impelled Shakespeare to do so. A whole drama is a complex paradigmatic situation made up of component paradigmatic situations, not a sequence of linguistic acts or propositions despite the fact that it is composed of dialogues. The same is true of a novel, despite the fact that it consists of sentences relating a tale. The latter is also a paradigmatic situation, not a sequence of assertions, but a string of illustrations in form of events. Thus literature composed of words does not consist of words or propositions. Words are its medium but not its artistic stuff.

The poetic comparison is pictorial in nature and the *secundum comparationis* is the ideological picture of the *primum.* But supposing that *H* is a horse and *E* is music. Then *E* can not be pictorial in the sense of a painting, despite program music (for instance, Saint-Saëns' ''Symphony of the Animals''). However such pictorial similarity is not required in our scheme. All that is needed is the valuational equivalence between *H* and *E,* and this is possible regardless of the medium employed. The musical *E* must not be ''iconic'' of *H.* The valuational equivalence between *H* and *E* can be musically expressed, since *E* is not a proposition but an illustration of *H.* An exclamation of pain (''ah'') is not ''iconic'' of pain, but there is valuational equivalence between it and pain; therefore it is understandable as an expression of pain. Our scheme holds also for music. The musical work corresponds to the *secundum comparationis* as *E,* while the musician's impressions of the world are the *H* of our scheme (the *primum comparationis*). They evoke ideas in the mind of the musician *I,* embodied in a system of sounds *E.* The whole transaction is similar, although the medium of expression is different. Music *E* is something a man utters (vocally or vicariously by instrumentation) when impressed

by the objects H (some thing in the world), and there is valuational equivalence between E and H as formed on the propositional level I.[4]

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Province and Function of Law. Law as Logic, Justice and Social Control. A Study of Jurisprudence. JULIUS STONE. Sydney, Australia: Associated General Publications Pty. Ltd. Distributed by Maitland Publications. 1946. lxiv + 918 pp. $15.00.

Courts on Trial. Myth and Reality in American Justice. JEROME FRANK. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1949. xii + 441 pp. $5.00.

Living Law of Democratic Society. JEROME HALL. Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1949. 146 pp. $2.50.

Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel. HUNTINGTON CAIRNS. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1949. xv + 583 pp. $7.50.

Publications since the end of the war on the theory of law have been unusually synoptic and systematic. Moreover, writers have been exceptionally concerned to link the concepts and problems of law with those of philosophy and to search out for themselves the philosophic presuppositions and problems affecting the interpretation of law. It is perhaps significantly indicative of the state of present philosophy that none of the four authors whose books are reviewed here are primarily in philosophy, academically speaking.

By far the most significant book published in this field in many years is *The Province and Function of Law* by Professor Julius Stone. The author of this monumental survey and treatise is Challis Professor of Jurisprudence and International Law at the University of Sydney. He has published one other book, *Law in the Modern State* (1939), a number of monographs, numerous articles, and two volumes of source materials on law. He taught at Harvard Law School and worked with Roscoe Pound on several projects while there.

Early reviews both in the United States and in Great Britain have been lavish in their praise and, in my opinion, with considerable justification. One reviewer goes so far as to state "It would not be surprising if [Professor Stone's] influence on future gen-

[4] For a fuller discussion compare my article "On Musical Semantics," this JOURNAL, Vol. XXXIX (1942), pp. 421–432.

erations of lawyers proved comparable to that of Austin." This may be excessive, but there is little doubt that the work is the most complete welding of economic, legal, sociological, historical, political, logical, methodological, jurisprudential, and philosophical materials bearing on the nature of law that has been produced for a long, long time. It is a unique contribution even if viewed solely in terms of the comprehensiveness of its critical survey of theories bearing on one or another aspect of law.

Professor Stone's opening remarks give a simple statement of the scope of the book:

> Anglo-American juristic interests have been largely concentrated, in the century since Austin, on the logic of the law, on the effort to view the precepts of the legal system in whole or in part as a logically self-consistent system. Increasingly, however, the attention of a restless world is being directed towards two other questions. One of these is the question of justice. . . . The other question concerns law as a social reality. It inquires concerning the actual effects of the law upon men's attitudes and behaviour, and the effects of these latter upon the law. This brief series of questions sets the boundaries of the present work. The aim is to explore them for the common law of our own times. [P. vii.]

The book is divided into three major parts corresponding to the questions indicated in the quotation. Part I, "Law and Logic," consists of two sections: a systematic critical exposition of the analytic jurisprudence of Austin, Roguin, Kelsen, and Hohfeld; and secondly, an independent detailed factual and logical analysis of the strength and limits of formal logic in legal reasoning, followed by a new formulation of the theory of precedent in pretty clearly instrumentalist terms. This latter section contains, among much else, the most systematic account in print of the ways in which formal legal categories are put to use in transforming law. The section was published separately in 1945.

Part II, "Law and Justice," analyzes the main types of theories of the end of law and of the criteria of legal judgment. A relatively brief and not too satisfactory review and summary critique of natural law theories, which gives special attention to Grotius, is followed by a closer consideration of Kant's "Metaphysical Individualism" and the whole theory of natural rights, Bentham's "Individualist Utilitarianism," Mill's and Ihering's "Social Utilitarianism," Stammler's "Social Idealism," the "Neo-Hegelian Civilisation Theory of Justice" with principal attention to Kohler's development of this position, Duguit's search for justice in "Social Solidarism," and, finally, Pound's attempt at a pragmatic synthesis of his predecessors' contributions through the idea of the "securing of interests" and the idea of jural postulates. Though

genuinely sympathetic to Pound's approach, of which he makes much use, Stone makes an extremely effective critique of both the theoretical adequacy and the practical relevance of Pound's position. Whereas a "crypto-idealism characterizes much of the empiricism of Pound as it does of other 'empiricists' such as Duguit, it is even clearer that all forms of 'natural law' are vitiated by an even more controlling 'crypto-empiricism.'" Stone's general scepticism concerning the net results of the different efforts to clarify and to formulate an idea of justice is very well argued. Their use appears to him to be moral rather than intellectual in the sense that any review of them should generate a genuine humility and a keen awareness of the difficulties of basic teleological judgment.

Part III, "Law and Society," is divided into three main sections, preceded by a most illuminating treatment of the methodological and classificatory problems involved in the study of the complex relations of law to other aspects of society. The first section centers around theories of historical development and problems of correlating the development of legal institutions with socio-historical change. Savigny, Maine, Durkheim, and Vinogradoff receive primary attention. The second section is an analysis of modern Anglo-American law in terms of the interests secured by it and the claims that are clamoring for more effective embodiment. The framework for this factual review is taken substantially from Pound, but with modifications. Law is viewed as having as its primary subject-matter types of interests, and its minimal function is taken to be the adjustment of conflicting interests. Apart from its content value, this section can be recommended for the stimulus its self-conscious theoretical substructure gives to the student of value theory. The third section shifts the focus from law as by-product of social process and law as adjustment of interests to law taken in its broadest sense as political intelligence, law as control of controls. Here the fundamental problems of law and power, law and its relations to other forms of control, are grappled with before coming to the contemporary expression of the eternal problem of freedom and order.

Such a summary as this of the book does little more than begin to indicate the complexity and the multiplicity of materials with which Professor Stone has built. This book is so much more than a treatise on law in any usual sense of that term that it could as appropriately be regarded as a study in politics, social theory, intellectual history, or any number of other studies. It would do the book a grave injustice, however, to regard it as a number of books put between two covers. It is, despite its complexity, a

single book. Each part of it serves to deepen our understanding of a total problem—the problem of human life in society. Though in appearance it is a survey of others' thoughts, in actuality it is a documented social theory that builds on a critical appropriation of its predecessors. It is guided throughout by a moral interest; it is a search for understanding in the interest of control. The fundamental vision that informs the author's whole discussion, determining his principles of criticism of the many students of society that are passed in review and guiding the structure as a whole, is the possibility man has in contemporary organized society of self-direction and control of his destiny. But Professor Stone's faith is a sober faith, sobered by a thorough recognition of the complexity of the problems, the inadequacy of the tools, and the elusiveness of justice as fact and as idea.

In contrast with Professor Stone, who starts with the whole of law, Judge Jerome Frank surveys law from the point at which law as official meshes with the raw materials of social conflict, the trial court. For over twenty years, Judge Jerome Frank has, in his interpretations of law, made the trial court central. *Courts on Trial* makes this perspective fully explicit. It summarizes, deepens, and qualifies Judge Frank's often expressed views of the attributes, powers, limitations, and present correctible and incorrectible defects of law. To center on the trial court is to center on the nature and rôle of fact determination in judgment. Full concentration on the process italicizes not only the inherent subjectivity of fact judgment, but carries with it as corollaries, according to Judge Frank, the inherent uncertainty of law, the greater importance of the trial as against the upper court in law making, the similar priority in importance of fact over rule, the impossibility of a predictive legal science, the need for redefinition of justice. If these principles were accepted instead of ignored, denied, or soft-pedalled, as is done, according to Judge Frank, by philosophers of law as well as by practitioners of all levels, much in the way of reform could be accomplished. These reforms include drastic revision of present courtroom practices in trial and in review; revision of our estimate and use of juries, of rules of evidence, of the rôle of judge, lawyer, and prosecutor, of the methods of trying cases, of legal training of lawyers in general and of trial judges in particular; and revision of the way rules are formulated and used, of the extent to which the uncontrolled and uncontrollable powers of judges were recognized, and the open and explicit individualizing of justice and judgment.

Whether one agrees with Judge Frank in his recommendations

or not depends only in part on the principles of Frank's theory of judicial law. For while his interpretation of law antedates his administrative experience, these reforms reflect on the whole an acceptance of administrative law methods. Judge Frank does not bring this comparison of administrative law and judicial law into focus, but the drive of most of his reforms is the transformation of judicial law into administrative law. The questions this raises when the reforms are seen in these terms are not fully treated by him.

Permanent improvement can not be achieved, according to Judge Frank, until the myths, pieties, errors, and absurdities buried deep in the psyche of lay and legal minds and fostered by the priests and "wizards" of contemporary legal science and philosophy as well as by social scientists are uprooted. Hardly any writer on law today is free of the charge of seeking delusive escapes from a recognition of the reality of "chanciness" in law.

Indeed the book is almost fanatic in this respect. Carried along by this singleminded passion, Frank finds the mark of the devil everywhere, often in those, like Karl Llewellyn, who share much of Judge Frank's views. Their crime often boils down to the fact that they have given attention to matters other than trial court uncertainties. Because they try to ferret out judicial uniformities in terms, principally, of upper court behavior and of upper court's written opinions, they are "magic addicts" and "second class wizards." Even though not blinded by the paper rules of an analytic jurisprudence, they are none the less seeking prediction rules and thus serve to perpetuate the myth of prediction and of certainty. What is true in this charge is innocuous and much of it is misleading. It is misleading because it assumes that those criticized are seeking predictability for unique events, which is not the case. It is misleading also because it is predicated upon a conception of rule in relation to fact that those criticized have sought to transcend. The conception of rules as simply rules in books, verbal formulas, neither represents the conception of those criticized, nor, indeed, Frank's conception of them except when he is glorifying the rôle of facts in decision.

Despite misleading exaggerations there is much sanity and fruitful thought in this book. It is necessary to read and reflect on it as a whole, however, for particular statements, chapters, and, sometimes even, themes running throughout the book, have to be put against other materials in order to be seen for what they intend. Somewhere along the line Judge Frank discovered Aristotle. The effect has been very beneficial.

On the other side of the fence from Judge Frank and under a somewhat obscure title, Professor Jerome Hall has written a fight-

ing and sometimes overheated book of inquiry on the nature of positive law. It is at once a defense of the inquiry itself (i.e., the search for a "real" definition) and a defense of a maximum definition (law as "a distinctive coalescence of form, value and fact") as against a minimum definition in terms of power norms only. The arguments are carried on interstitially and as part of the exposition of the elements that go to make up the distinctive coalescence of law. Professor Hall's treatment of the various elements of law and the problems of jurisprudence to which they give rise—the domain of positive law, its distinction from general norms of behavior, the rôle of facts, of rules, of judges, the nature and relations of substantive and procedural law, of the relation of legal to social problems, of legal reasoning and its distinctive character—strikes a conservative balance between the various extremes which have been taken by writers on these problems. The most distinctive aspect of the book, however, is the inclusion of the democratic ideal as an intrinsic part of the definition of positive law. In order to do this Professor Hall has returned to the tradition of natural law.

The argument for natural law is obscure and somewhat questionable. A maximum definition of law includes value and valuation as an essential element. Yet on any other terms than natural law, the author seems to argue, we can not include values. Why? The argument for this seems to be based upon a gross ambiguity. Because the naturalist, the positivist, the pragmatist, and so on, deny any transcendent principles of value and in some cases deny the cognitive status of values, Professor Hall apparently believes that they deny that values have anything to do with law. But since common sense, etc., knows that valuing goes on, therefore, it follows that a particular theory of the valuing process is true and necessary for the theory of positive law. While it is true that some of the men mentioned, e.g., Pound, deny the presence in law of value in the sense of transcendent objective principles, it does not follow that they deny value in the sense of a process independent of whatever theory one may have to account for it or that they deny rational objectivity to evaluative processes. And while it is true that common sense and practical contact with the law force acknowledgment that valuing goes on, it is not clear that this coerces acknowledgment of natural law. Professor Hall points up many of the defects in current theories of value, but from the inadequacy of these treatments it is not clear why the truth of an *a priori* concept of natural law follows. Nor does the persistence of natural law theories in the history of jurisprudence prove its

truth, as Professor Hall seems to argue; it may only reveal a problem.

Part of the difficulty in following Professor Hall's argument is due to the obscurity of his idea of natural law. For while Hall criticizes Dewey, Pound, Bentham, and many others and appears to hold in opposition to them some *a priori* intuitional view of objective principles, he none the less summarizes his definition of natural law in terms which, until more carefully interpreted, could well be accepted by them. The modern version of natural law that is being defended, the author tells us, is that "valuations make sense," "that there are better and worse answers to moral problems, and that the better (justice) are rationally defensible ('objectively valid')."

More comparable than the others to the work of Professor Stone is that of Huntington Cairns. *Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel* is a documentation of the conviction that a fruitful philosophy of law depends upon a total philosophy and contrariwise that a significant philosophy will have vital implications for the theory and practice of law. It is equally a harvesting of the legal fruits of past philosophy. Plato, Aristotle, Cicero (as summarizing Roman philosophical speculation), Aquinas, Bacon, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel receive extended treatment.

A harvest from such diverse sources raises a problem of reconciliation. Cairns's solution is not eclecticism, though there is much of this, nor dogmatism, though there is selective preference both in the whole project and in the parts, nor transcendence in the sense of finding some transcendental unity of idea, though cultural unity beneath local idiom is found, especially on ideas of justice. Cairns solves the problem primarily in terms of the idea of the "jural hypothesis": the test of an idea is not its truth but its relevance in advancing the solution of legal problems. Relevance is measured both in terms of history and in terms of the contemporary scene. By history is meant the philosopher's own world and also his later influence. This fundamental device has great power and Cairns makes good use of it, but it may be a source of distortion and in its extreme form may lead to historical myth. Cairns avoids most of this, but if there is any general weakness in the book it stems from this source. His treatment of Plato suffers, it seems to this reviewer, from "modern dress" distortion as well as elements of the *post hoc* fallacy.

The characteristics of Cairns's treatment of his subject-matter may be illustrated by his discussion of Francis Bacon. An in-

troductory and exceedingly cogent statement of Bacon's central philosophical and methodological themes entering self-consciously and directly as guides to his theory of law—the unity of science, the union of theory and practice, the need for method, knowledge as control, the ideal of certainty—is followed by an integrated exposition of Bacon's general theory of law. This includes his conceptions of the task of jurisprudence, the relation of law to other central institutions, the origin of law and justice, the nature of right, the distinction between public and private law, the theory of the constitution and the coördinated doctrine of the relation of common law to administrative law. All of these doctrines are placed in the context of the general legal and political problems of England and in the context of the political interests and fortunes of Bacon, particularly with reference to his competition with Coke.

A more detailed treatment is given to Bacon's ideal of and proposals for achieving maximum certainty in law, his resolution of the dilemma of general and individual justice, the sources of uncertainty in law, Bacon's historically conditioned opposition to custom as a source of law, and his theory of legal reasoning. Cairns's treatment of this latter, the nature, proper policy limitations, and uses of analogical reasoning, illustrates especially well Cairns's approach to his materials. After a careful statement of Bacon's ideas, he compares them with those of Savigny and reviews the general theory of analogy as it is found in Mill, Joseph, Eaton, Keynes, and as it is illustrated in recent court decisions. Returning to Bacon, Cairns reviews the theory of legal reasoning as a theory of the judicial process and compares it with the positions of Cardozo, Pound, and Dewey.

It should be clear from this illustration that Cairns's task is larger than the writing of a legal history narrowly conceived. His interest is fundamentally systematic, and the present volume is, indeed, the third in a sequence of four. *Law and the Social Sciences,* and *The Theory of Legal Science* have already been published and the fourth, *The Elements of Legal Science,* will, in the author's words, apply and expand the conclusions of the other three. The present volume can be judged best, therefore, as a part of the whole. It is not premature, however, to recognize the merit of the enterprise of conceiving the problem of law in its broadest possible terms.

Despite the many differences between the authors of these four books it will not be difficult for the historian to associate them with a single period. Analytic jurisprudence is at a minimum here. There is a common focus on law as process and as a tool of

control. Kelsen's positivist emphasis on law as power norm has apparently not been fruitful for these men. In contrast the view of law as a living phase of social process and moral search is equally present in all these writers. Finally, guiding all the writers, including Judge Frank, is the conviction that a philosophy of law not rooted in a total philosophy can not meet its own problems. They are all efforts to crystallize the sense of our era on the meaning of law. None are definitive, but all are worth while.

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Essays in Political Theory. Presented to George H. Sabine. Edited by MILTON R. KONVITZ and ARTHUR E. MURPHY. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press. 1948. viii + 333 pp.

This volume in honor of Professor Sabine consists mainly of essays in the history of political ideas. The contributions are of uneven quality, and they treat themes so various that perhaps no one but Professor Sabine himself could pass competent judgment on all of them. I have space to mention but very briefly those which struck me as especially informative or illuminating.

Arthur E. Murphy's essay, "Mr. Northrop and Mr. Locke," is a vigorous and refreshingly unrestrained critique of Mr. Northrop's recent revelations on the foundations of liberalism. It does justice both to Mr. Locke and Mr. Northrop, restoring Locke's social philosophy to something like the shape it had when it left his hands and before it came into Mr. Northrop's. Professor G. Watts Cunningham's "Reason, Morality, and Democracy" is a trenchant and ingenious statement of the idealist position in ethics, and though I do not think Mr. Cunningham succeeds in avoiding the dilemmas he finds in other positions, his essay is one of the more penetrating and provocative statements of this position that has recently appeared. Glenn Morrow's "Plato and the Law of Nature" is lucid and suggestive; Francis Wormuth, in his discussion of "Aristotle on Law," is thorough and sharp-sighted, and he reveals the levels of ambiguity buried in the classic phrase, "rule by law." Other essays, especially those by Max Fisch, R. R. Palmer, and R. E. Cushman, also do credit to the man in whose honor they have been written, containing something of Professor Sabine's historical perspective, scholarly hard-headedness, and unfailing candor. I have no doubt that other critics would pick out still other essays for mention.

I wish, however, to devote most of my remarks to two analytical and critical essays by former students of Professor Sabine, Pro-

fessors Julius Weinberg and Frederick Will. These essays provide a useful point of departure for the consideration of Sabine's value-theory, and are also suggestive of the current misunderstandings which continue to divide philosophers in this field. Messrs. Will and Weinberg have a bone to pick with their former teacher. As Mr. Will puts the issue,

> Where [Sabine's] view fails signally to furnish the kind of basis one wants for holding that democratic ideals, say, are better than totalitarian ones is in its incapacity to provide a proof, evidence, or an objective reason—because it holds that such things cannot in principle be provided—that in holding these things to be better he is right. What it offers instead . . . is the possibility that one may be clear . . . about what, in such a judgment of value or goodness, one is accepting without evidence or proof. [P. 267.]

Mr. Weinberg's ingenious and serious-minded essay, "On Sabine's Philosophy of Value," attempts to show how this shortcoming can be corrected. He writes,

> We can agree with Professor Sabine's view that facts do not imply values and that we do not have unerring moral intuitions of moral qualities. We can also afford to concede that basic value judgments are linguistically primitive . . . [and] that choice and preference are accompaniments or even ingredients of moral judgment. Our position is, however, that basic moral judgment is not exhaustively reducible to preferences, choices, or volitions, or feelings of other kinds." [P. 256.]

Now, Professor Sabine certainly does not argue that all value-judgments are capricious; and, as far as I can see, he is under no necessity to say that *any* value-judgments need be entirely capricious, since the so-called "basic" element might be a component of value-judgments, but in fact never occur in isolation. Or, again, he might argue that where such "basic" preferences do occur in isolation, as in the case of madmen or fanatics, this is precisely what he means by "capricious"; but that he does not have to argue that value-judgments are capricious when basic preferences are accompanied by factual or logical considerations. Indeed, all that Sabine says in the key passages which Dr. Weinberg quotes is that choice is an uneliminable *element* in value systems, and he adds that it is limited by requirements of consistency.

Nevertheless, this is apparently enough to leave Dr. Weinberg with the feeling that there is a significant difference between his own views and those of Sabine. He seems to think that anyone who holds that reference to human feelings or attitudes is essential to the justification of value-statements necessarily implies the impossibility of "objectivity" in value-judgments. He begins, therefore, with an attempted refutation of the "naturalistic" doctrine that ethical terms "express states of feeling." He selects for his

target what he calls "the simplest, and in many ways the most plausible, form of naturalism," which maintains "that people *can* be utterly mistaken about the character of value judgments" (p. 250). Most people think that ethical terms have a "substantive referent," at least when they are used "objectively." But "naturalism," in maintaining the "subjectivity" of value-statements, argues that most people are deceived in this respect about the character of their valuations. "And the point is not . . . that we are incapable of any self-deception in all these matters, but rather that, if such theories were true, we would be incapable of anything else" (p. 252). But, Mr. Weinberg points out, we have tests by which we distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable moral attitudes, and the existence of such tests is "quite inconsistent with the doctrine that all ostensibly moral attitudes and judgments are cases of self-deception" (p. 252).

But exactly what is Dr. Weinberg trying to disprove? I certainly agree with him that he has given a very simple statement of "naturalism." But the negative evidence he adduces is irrelevant even to the "position" he has stated. For it does not deny that men have tests by which they distinguish "genuinely moral attitudes" from "pseudo-moral attitudes"; it does not even necessarily deny that there is an identifiable difference between "objectivity" and "subjectivity" in moral contexts. It merely offers an interpretation of these tests, and (at most) disagrees with one interpretation of their nature. For instance, it *might* argue that "objectivity" does not necessarily imply a "substantive referent." And this sort of point Mr. Weinberg does not even bother to argue.

Nor do I think that Mr. Weinberg can really mean to concede that we can not infer values from facts. The positive alternative to Professor Sabine's position which he proposes rests on an analogy between "perceptual judgments" and "moral judgments." "We have criteria which confirm the existence of perceptual objects and we have criteria which would disconfirm such existence. Analogously, we have criteria which confirm the objectively valuable character of states of affairs . . ." (p. 254). Now, of course, we might call the taste of an apple "good," and subsequently, through appropriate tests, discover that our experience was the product of a pathological bodily condition. In this sense, the "goodness" of the apple would be "subjective." But I fail to see that the perception of the objective value of an apple (i.e., "tasting good") tells us that the apple is what it ought to be. Apparently, however, Mr. Weinberg is prepared to restate Mill's argument that the proof that something is desirable is that it is desired: "It may . . . be that some factual characteristics of acts or states have value.

So if such characteristics do in fact characterize an actual action or state of affairs, such a state of affairs will be what it ought to be" (p. 248). I can not believe that Dr. Weinberg really means to erase the distinction between "value" and "valuable"; but if he retains it, his argument unfortunately breaks down.

Mr. Will, in his paper, "Values, Objectivity, and Democracy," addresses himself to the moving statement which Professor Sabine made in his lecture, "Democracy and Preconceived Ideas":

> At some point a nation confronts its final conviction about what it is possible for human life to be and what they desire that it should become, and upon that choice they build their civilization and so they make their place in history. On that conviction it has to stake its life and fortune.

Like Mr. Weinberg, Mr. Will believes that Hume's distinction between truths of reason, truths of fact, and value judgments is true, but that it is not the whole truth. Mr. Will's improvement on this position rests on the following empirical allegation:

> Human beings differ in their appetites and tastes for some things much less than for others and . . . in their capacity to appreciate many things they differ even less than in their *de facto* appetites, and about some things little if at all. . . . Upon this, or something like this, the objectivity of value judgments, and hence the objective ground of moral imperatives, seems to depend. [P. 273.]

Now, the fact that there are common values certainly provides a condition for the reasonable adjustment of disagreements, but I am afraid I do not see how it provides a guarantee of such adjustment. Nor, certainly, is there any *a priori* reason why men should, under all circumstances, place the values they hold in common above the values on which they differ. Even "peace" is not an absolute value, nor is " agreement"; and, in fact, most moral men are admired because they are not prepared to give up certain of their key values, even in the interests of "peace." Why, after all, do we hold in contempt those who wanted "to do business with Hitler?" It is an unfortunate fact that business *was* a common interest.

Mr. Will, however, seems to maintain a variant of the ancient and honorable conviction that virtue is knowledge, and that where men give different values to certain things the root cause is ignorance. Thus, he says of democracy, as his proof of its superiority, that it has superior capacities

> for making life more deeply and broadly satisfying. . . . One may maintain to those who are doubtful of the values of the democratic life, that if they try them they too will find that . . . they have been choosing the worse because they did not know the better, and they will not, if the opportunity is open, choose it further.

I rather suspect, however, that Mr. Will's argument goes further than he would like. Most of those who have had a good taste of dictatorships would no doubt prefer life in a democracy if they had a chance to experience it. But there are also men who have spent so much time in prison that they prefer to go back after a taste of the responsibilities of freedom. And I do not think that the experience of such people provides a reason why anybody's faith in democracy should be shaken. Unfortunately, however, it would provide such a reason in terms of Mr. Will's attempt to provide a ground for democracy in the universal facts of human nature.

I dwell on this, not in order to engage in political apologetics, but to emphasize an issue which seems to me to lie at the basis of the disagreements that now separate those who espouse the so-called "emotive" theory of values from certain other naturalistically inclined philosophers like Dr. Will. This can perhaps be brought out in the following way. It is all very well to speak, as does Mr. Will, of the "consequences" of choices, but one of the consequences of certain kinds of choice is a change in the set of attitudes by which we evaluate consequences. A given course of action may so affect our future point of view that, while we should not approve of its future consequences if we were to experience them as we are constituted now, we can say with considerable assurance that we will approve them in the future.

Such decisions, where our existing system of values is imperiled, are not trivial exceptions, but the crucial ones in moral and social life. These are the cases where we have to decide on the kind of values we want to have. And, under such circumstances, it seems to me quite plain that we can not resolve our doubts about the validity of certain values unless we have some unquestioned value which we wish to maintain into the future—some "initiating imperative," as I should say—which serves as the pivot on which our decision swings. We may hold this imperative provisionally, recognizing its relation to factual beliefs and to other deeper imperatives of which we may not be aware; but if we do not hold it, all talk about "satisfying consequences" is vacuous.

Now if, as I suspect, something of this sort is what Professor Sabine means by "a final conviction about what it is possible for human life to be . . ." then it seems to me quite unexceptionable. In every policy decision there is some value which we must accept without proof; and for certain decisions, which embrace a wide and portentous range of events, the "finality" of our values is dramatized. I suspect that Professor Sabine's critics are disturbed at the apparent suggestion that such values are also *unquestionable* as

well as *unquestioned*, and there is much in Professor Sabine's tone and emphasis to justify this feeling. But he himself says that "we stake our lives and fortunes" on such decisions. The unquestioned values of which he speaks are "final," it seems to me, only for the particular context in question. They are not "final" in the sense that there is no further context, and no other time, in which they might be questioned. It is only that when they are questioned, some other "final conviction" will have to be invoked. And this is all, I suspect, that Professor Sabine has meant to argue. Far from denying "objectivity" in value judgments, it sketches the way in which we might be objective in such affairs.

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BOOK NOTES

Introduction to Realistic Philosophy. JOHN WILD. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1948. xi + 517 pp. $4.50.

The purpose of this book, as stated by its author, is "to provide the modern student and general reader with a sympathetic introduction to the basic concepts and principles of classical, realistic philosophy" (p. ix). The work consists of a short historical introduction, followed by two main parts: the first, in eleven chapters covering 235 pages, treats of individual and social ethics, and the second, in 221 further pages, contains four chapters on change, causality, the cosmos and God, followed by four chapters on the human soul and its faculties.

"Realistic philosophy" is defined, in the introductory chapter, as that which rests on these three basic doctrines: "(1) There is a world of real existence which men have not made or constructed; (2) this real existence can be known by the human mind; and (3) such knowledge is the only reliable guide to human conduct, individual and social" (p. 6). Apart from the suggestion that ethics is deducible from cosmology, this definition scarcely distinguishes "realistic philosophy" from any other school of thought. But the historical sketch gives more than a clue to the meaning which Professor Wild attaches to the label, since it indicates that "realistic philosophy" is a synthesis of the teachings of Plato and Aristotle, very closely identified with the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. The philosophical parts of St. Thomas's *Summa theologica* are said to "constitute the most complete and accurate account of realistic thought that has been so far achieved" (p. 26), and only minor imperfections are indicated in it. Immediately

after St. Thomas, "radically non-realistic" tendencies were introduced by Scotus and Ockham, which remained dominant throughout the period of modern philosophy, and still dominate contemporary thinking in the forms of scepticism, positivism, pragmatism, existentialism, and naturalism. The hope of the future lies in the revival of "realistic philosophy"—essentially, in a return to the *philosophia perennis* on which Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas were supposedly in agreement.

The treatment of ethics, in Part I, is pervaded by the doctrine that the moral order rests on "natural law" grounded in a hierarchical structure and functioning of the cosmos, and in similar hierarchical ordering of the faculties and natural activities of man. Most of this section consists of descriptive and classificatory discussion of the traditional virtues and vices, and of the order and functions of social groups, in which formal, efficient, and final causes are distinguished, and governmental authority established as a "necessary accident" of social organization. The social and moral function of religion in human life is taken up in the final chapter of this part.

The scond part of the book, on "philosophy of nature," passes to the theoretical consideration of the ontological foundations of the moral order treated in Part I. Aristotle's hylomorphic analysis of change is presented, and the four causes, the ten categories, chance and necessity, and the arguments for the existence of God (or of a First Cause of Change) are expounded in a mixed Aristotelian-Platonic-Thomist language. Not much concern is shown for the differences which are involved in the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Thomist conceptions of God as cause of all things, or for the difficulties involved in construing Aristotle's First Mover as a Creator. The divine attributes and perfections are, however, deduced in the manner of medieval treatises of theology, providing the means of unifying the good, and true, and the real, at the apex of the hierarchical universe. The last four chapters, on "philosophical anthropology," give a blurred résumé of Aristotle's *De anima*, defining the soul and developing the classification of faculties—the five external and four internal senses, the active and possible intellects, and the sensory and rational appetites. In connection with the psychology of rational cognition, a discussion of the problem of universals is introduced, in which "nominalism" and "extreme realism" are contrasted unfavorably with the Thomist and "realistic" position.

Doubtless much can be said in favor of building an introductory course around a single traditional approach, so that the main

problems of philosophic inquiry can be given a more adequate and significant development than is possible through a superficial survey of conflicting systems. But this book, despite its exclusion of everything modern, has not achieved this goal. For the attempt to fuse such divergent philosophies as those of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas, into a single *philosophia perennis*, has the net result of reducing their doctrines to a least common denominator amounting to little more than the vocabulary used in their formulation. Few of the significant issues, whose resolution depends on something more than questions of terminology and classification, are developed or pursued by Professor Wild; and where such genuinely philosophic problems are introduced, they are introduced not as problems but as basic assumptions to be accepted as evident or necessary premises, as in the case of the conception of natural law. The book could, of course, be employed as material for criticism; but it is scarcely an introduction, in itself, to the use of a critical method.

E. A. M.

Phases of Thought in England. MEYRICK H. CARRÉ. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. New York: Oxford University Press. 1949. xix + 392 pp. $7.75.

Most treatments of English philosophy take their starting point with Francis Bacon. This book, described by its author as "a brief survey of successive moments in the life of philosophy in England from the first age of Christian culture to the close of the nineteenth century" (p. ix), seeks to exhibit the continuity of modern British thought with its medieval ancestry, and to show how certain distinctive attitudes, first developed in the Middle Ages, continued to be effective in the period after Bason. An introductory chapter treats of "Biblical Philosophy" as the groundwork of the western Christian tradition, and then the development of the Augustinian tradition is traced up to the end of the twelfth century, special emphasis being given to the influence of St. Anselm on British thought. Aristotelian philosophy, so important in the scholastic tradition of thirteenth century Paris, is held to have had a much more superficial and temporary vogue in England. While the Augustinian aspects of Scotist theology are stressed, Ockham is exhibited in the usual manner as a destroyer and sceptic. The treatment of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is of necessity sketchy, due to the relative lack of published philosophical texts or secondary literature on which to base a more adequate treatment; but the religious and political controversies of the period are

discussed as illustrative of the main themes and attitudes characterizing the English philosophical tradition. The last half of the book traces the development of the "Newtonian" type of philosophy which dominated England from the seventeenth into the nineteenth century, relating it to its roots in the Augustinian and Nominalist trends of later medieval thought in England. The book ends with a chapter on nineteenth century naturalism and idealism in their English development.

Despite numerous inaccuracies of detailed interpretation, and an obvious dependence on secondary literature for a great part of the exposition and interpretation of materials—especially those of the fourteenth century, the book has considerable merit as a survey. It is successful in its basic purpose of showing the links between the modern phase of English thought, represented by Locke and Newton, and antecedent tendencies which had become established on English soil in the medieval period. The important part played by the predominantly "fideist" type of Augustinian theology to which the English scholastics adhered, in determining the tendencies of later British philosophy toward a sceptical attitude in metaphysics and toward a positivistic and empiricist tendency in the conception of natural knowledge, is nicely brought out. The many references to sources and secondary literature, in the footnotes, add up to a comprehensive and useful bibliography for those seeking more detailed knowledge of the less known periods of English philosophy.

E. A. M.

Symbol and Metaphor in Human Experience. MARTIN FOSS. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1949. 205 pp. $3.00.

Mr. Foss precedes his thesis by a brief account of the sensationalist and rationalist traditions which derived whatever merit they had from the limitations they imposed upon each other. While the sensationalist must call attention to the artificialities of rational construction and the rationalist, in turn, must counteract the confusing ambiguities of the senses, "yet neither of them alone can penetrate into the metaphysical depth of the fundamental problems" (p. 12). The reason that these two schools of thought can not, but that the author, along with Aristotle, Leibniz, and Hegel, e.g., can, reach these problems is a consequence of his conviction that there is only one true philosophical method, the dialectical one. Its meaning is exhausted by the prescription for the philosopher to

negate systematically the world of symbols, to remain in the process of searching, in the sense of perpetually transcending the structures, fixations, and rituals which symbol-using man must erect from different perspectives and for different purposes.

The philosopher's harvest from a dialectic so conceived can only be problems; but that, to the author, would not be a shortcoming. "Its problematic attitude has enabled philosophy to understand life which can only be 'understood' as a problem . . . to be realized in a future equally problematic" (p. 103). Actually, this symbol-transcending character of the dialectical method in philosophy is only one instance of what Foss calls the "metaphorical process" and which accounts for: (1) the transcendence of ritual and dogma by communion and prayer (in myth and religion), (2) the transcendence of feelings and materials by the process of artistic creation (in art), and (3) the transcendence of works and laws by the realization of love (in ethics). It is the discussion of selected aspects in these realms of "human experience" which makes up the most rewarding part of the book and can be appreciated even by those unconvinced that the illumination found there must follow from the adoption of the proposed method.

Contrary to what the title suggests, this book is not designed to offer a technical discussion of symbolic and metaphorical forms. Its author neither employs nor argues the many distinctions elaborated by investigators of signs and symbols since the turn of the century. Peirce receives one footnote, Cassirer two; no others are mentioned. In view of the fact that the connotation of "metaphorical process" is quite original with Mr. Foss, one finds himself wishing that he had chosen to expound it in less metaphorical terms. From the author's position, this wish would probably not be reasonable. According to him, it is only about symbols that one can be definite, while the "metaphorical process" (like being, existence, and life) is all movement, transcendence, and tension, and as such resists adequate description. It is the old problem all over again: how is one to distinguish "essence" from "existence" if all one can say about the latter will again have to be in terms of the former? The difficulty of Mr. Foss's task arises from the impossibility of putting into symbols what, by stipulation, is beyond symbols. It is safe to assume, however, that the metaphysician will feel free to continue his inquiries while the logician will continue to deplore his occasional lack of conciseness.

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Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy. Selected Essays. LEONARD NELSON. Translated by Thomas K. Brown III. Foreword by Brand Blanshard. Introduction by Julius Kraft. New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. Oxford University Press. 1949. xxii + 275 pp. $3.75.

Leonard Nelson was an unusually inspired and effective teacher of philosophy, whose intellectual vigor and exemplary forthrightness developed in his many disciples the sense of a brotherhood engaged in a great philosophical and moral renaissance. He combined his oral teachings with an intimately related overt concern with pressing political and social issues, and he stimulated in his hearers a similar burning zeal for a righteous social order. Yet Nelson is almost unknown in this country; and except for a collection of essays dealing with broader questions of social philosophy, which was published in 1928, the year of Nelson's death, under the title *Politics and Education*, the present volume is the first to make available in English some of his more technical philosophical studies. The volume deserves a warm welcome, even though Nelson's systematic views on ethics—a subject of paramount concern to him—are not adequately represented in it. But a translation of his *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* is already in preparation; and the reader is informed that the present book is only "the beginning of a comprehensive effort" to present Nelson to the English-speaking world.

Nelson was a Kantian who read Kant from the perspective of an admirer of Fries; and though he was no slavish follower of the Kantian word, he believed that the basic ideas of the critical philosophy must be taken as the foundations for a valid generalized account of man and nature. The task of philosophy, accordingly, is to make explicit the "presuppositions" underlying all particular beliefs, and to trace back to their source the *a priori* synthetic principles implicit in all forms of cognition. Most of the essays in this volume expound and illustrate this conception of philosophy's job, a conception that Nelson maintained to be simply a purified and matured continuation of the Socratic method; and they attempt to show that contrary to first impressions, developments in the sciences since Kant's day confirm the central claim of the critical philosophy that there is an immutable system of synthetic *a priori* principles which are operative in mathematics, natural science, ethics, and esthetics. At the same time, Nelson conducts a running battle with schools of thought which have been the alleged ruin of philosophy because of their failure to appreciate the force

of the Kantian-Friesian analyses. He argues that a theory of knowledge which seeks to produce *criteria* for the objective validity of beliefs is involved in a self-defeating infinite regress; and he maintains that dogmatic rationalism, mysticism, and empiricism are all guilty in one way or another of the fatal error of demanding a *demonstration* for the synthetic *a priori* truths presupposed by all intellectual activity. The genuine task for a critical philosophy, so he holds, is to engage in an empirical, psychological analysis of "inner experience" with a view to tracing back such presuppositions to their source in certain non-intuitive (i.e., nonsensory) immediate cognitions. Nelson believed he had the definitive answer to all forms of intellectual dogmatism, relativism, conventionalism, and scepticism; and he was confident that a comprehensive metaphysics and ethics can be developed on a thoroughly rational foundation within the framework of his own epistemological analyses.

But in spite of Nelson's familiarity with modern logic and mathematics (he was on terms of mutual friendship with Hilbert, and some of the outstanding contemporary contributors to mathematical logic were members of the neo-Friesian school), in spite of the interesting uses he made for his own purposes of Hilbert's methodological approach to mathematical foundation questions, and in spite of the relative clarity of his formulations, his argument for synthetic *a priori* truths is not likely to persuade any reader who is not antecedently committed to them. For example, it is difficult to take seriously his view that we do possess apodictically certain knowledge of geometric axioms; and there is *prima facie* reason for suspecting a philosophy which, as late as 1918, could still maintain that the complete explanation of a phenomenon consists in subsuming it under the basic laws of mechanics. However, though Nelson's central thesis may carry no conviction, he has many interesting and pertinent things to say on questions at the center of current discussions—on the relation of thought and language, on the distinction between analytic and synthetic, on the differences between an esthetic and a scientific view of nature, and much else. He is a challenging thinker and writer, and embodies in large measure his own ideal of the Socratic mission of philosophy.

Professor Kraft, a former student of Nelson, has written an informative and useful Introduction, which helps the reader to appreciate his teacher's singular position in pre-Hitler Germany.

E. N.

The Problems of Philosophy. SATISCHANDRA CHATTERJEE. Calcutta: Das Gupta & Co., Ltd. 1949. xvi + 349 pp. Rs 6/8.
Philosophy for Pleasure. HECTOR HAWTON. (Introduction by Prof. A. E. Heath.) New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. ix + 214. $3.75.

The first of these books, which was written to help students in Indian universities to overcome some of the difficulties they experience in understanding the philosophy of the West, is a well organized, clearly written text which reports and criticizes a great diversity of theories. Each chapter states a problem and various solutions which have been offered to it. Objections are then made to the latter and the author concludes with his own solution, very briefly stated. The exposition, perhaps because so much ground has to be covered, is often schematic, and the argument inconclusive, but there is a serious effort to get the student into the subject. The problems dealt with are: the concept and method of philosophy, the nature of knowledge, sense data, perception, etc., truth and error, external and internal relations, universals, thought, and reality. Dr. Chatterjee's views always seem to agree with Indian idealism or mysticism of some school or tendency, and he naturally has more sympathy with Bradley and Bosanquet than with the Cambridge group. In the first chapter he states that "yoga or concentration in which there is the cessation of all mental activities" is necessary for the experience of supersensuous reality, but that philosophy consists in the "rationalization" of this experience. He thus rejects the scientific approach, or scientific criteria, for philosophy, but also authoritarianism. Knowledge, in its metaphysical nature, he says, is "self-manifesting reality, and not an activity, relation or quality." He is attracted to Russell's theory of correspondence in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, which provides for truth independent of our knowing it, and analyzes the forms of indirect verification. The same theory, he says, is to be found in the logical realism of the Nyāya in Indian philosophy. The test of truth is in both cases pragmatic coherence. But though this Nyāya-Russell theory is valid, it requires completion and correction in a comprehensive idealistic frame. Many of the conclusions reached are not of special subtlety or interest. The book ends with the contention that though thought fails to grasp absolute reality, "it shows the necessity of admitting the absolute," which can then be known or realized by "pure contemplation." How much longer will Indian students be expected to believe such things? The most engaging feature of the volume

is the comparisons between the views of contemporary British philosophers and the doctrines of classical Indian thinkers.

Hector Hawton's book is a popular account of Greek philosophy, the Renaissance, the French Encyclopedists, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, and the development of contemporary logical and analytic types of philosophy. The style is no doubt crisp and rapid, and the quotations from many writers are often adroit, but the elimination of connections and nuances and the blunt unqualified summations do not really aid comprehension. The book has no special tendency. In fact the author takes the irritating view that philosophy is for pleasure. Although philosophy has made some advances, he contends that its *solid* progress has consisted not in answering questions, but in propounding *better* ones. After a few centuries this might become less pleasurable. The book would not do even for the most elementary students of philosophy, but might help the busy layman find out quickly "what it's all about."

V. J. McG.

The Psychology of Meaning. KALI PRASAD. Lucknow, India: University of Lucknow. 1949. 209 pp. Rs 10/ or 15 shillings.

This helpful book grew out of lectures addressed to the Faculty of Arts at the University of Lucknow. Beginning with astute remarks about method in psychology, Professor Prasad, head of the Department of Philosophy, rejects metaphysical psychologies of meaning on the one hand (Münsterberg, McDougall, *et al.*) and the atomistic associationists on the other. He dislikes vague verbalisms—to which even the mechanistic-causal method forces one eventually in its misguided attempt to "explain" meaning processes that can only be "understood." Such understanding is the "insight" which the phenomenological method yields. Using this method, the author develops a field-Gestalt theory of meaning, with some injections from depth psychology. He regrets that Lewin, with his otherwise promising topological psychology of meaning as vectors in a dynamic field of "life-space," overlooks the partial determination of such fields by factors in the unconscious.

Professor Prasad's book is both a useful critical résumé of current psychological theories of meaning and an instrument for further progress. The formulation of his own theory suffers a little from the vagueness and metaphor he so wisely tries to eschew and which are inherent in the categories of psychological field-theory, as for example, in the following "phenomenological" de-

scription: "The total field including both the conscious and unconscious factors, as also the social and cultural patterns, yields more or less meaningful wholes; and as the character of the field changes, as the whole life-space itself fluctuates and as the stresses of the situation touch the depths of an individual's being, meanings develop and crystallize themselves." But the *impression* this leaves one with is vivid, and gravid with important matter for subsequent *analysis*. Perhaps the most original chapter contains a significant application of Rorschach tests, not in the usual diagnosis of personalities, but to confirm the author's field theory of meaning—how meaning emerges at first as intuited wholes or forms which subsequently are fragmented, by analytical attention, into details that remain dependent, for their sense, on the total configuration.

V. C. A.

The Foundations of Common Sense. A Psychological Preface to the Problems of Knowledge. NATHAN ISAACS. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Limited. 1949. vii + 208 pp. 15/.

Instead of considering knowledge as the immediate perception of sense-data, Mr. Isaacs prefers to think of it as an item in the general psychology of a human being. He acknowledges his debt to both Baldwin and Dewey and thus pays more attention than is customary to the genesis of our ideas. Consequently many of the traditional problems of epistemology become irrelevant, just as some of his problems were irrelevant to traditional epistemology. Certainty, the externality of the world, the subjectivity of certain of the aspects of perception, duality between idea and object, to name only a few of the familiar topics of discussion, are rephrased. It is unlikely that people who believe epistemology to start with the perception of yellow patches here and now will find anything of value in this book. But to those who are willing to grant that certainty is achieved and not given, that knowledge arises in answer to questions, that questions have their psychological determinants and are not exclusively conditioned by logical formulas, the book on the contrary will appear as a valuable contribution to philosophy. Unfortunately the author writes in a type of English so colored by the jargon of the schools that a reader must summon up all his patience and good-will to comprehend its meaning. But one reader at least is able to testify that he has benefited by the sacrifice and hopes that many of his colleagues will do as much.

G. B.

The Social Structure of Values. RADHAKAMAL MUKERJEE. (Lucknow University Studies.) London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1949. xx + 418 pp. 18 s.

Mukerjee, who teaches sociology and economics at Lucknow University, wrote many books pertaining to his subjects. In *The Social Structure of Values* he utilizes findings from previous publications and lectures he delivered in the United States, London, and Geneva, while attending different international conferences. Certain portions of the book appeared in sociological periodicals in the United States and Great Britian. It is a fine scholarly work. Mukerjee combines erudition with genuine creativeness. The attentive reader will find no difficulty in appraising the synoptic character of the treatise in spite of its many references.

In opposition to those schools of contemporary sociology which "eschew" valuation and keep to "hard facts," Mukerjee's book is "a systematic attempt to present sociology from the viewpoint of valuation as the primum mobile in the social universe, the nexus of all human relations, groups and institutions" (p. vii). Reflecting upon the vast number of books on methodology and techniques of social sciences, the reviewer can not help quoting Lotze who says: "What's the use of sharpening the knife if we do not have the bread to cut." Values and valuations are for Mukerjee the bread of the social sciences. He rejects the "logic-tight dichotomy of the world of facts and the world of values" and traces it to "the philosophical and ethical atomism and the constricting biological naturalism of the nineteenth century" (p. 6). The social group is for him neither an "exalted super-individual entity" nor "an amorphous mass of free, uninstitutionalized individuals"; it is a "dynamic, structural-functional whole" (p. ix), where values play the most important rôle. Human need, behavior, and value comprise a unit. Values are both facts and norms; as facts they are visible embodiments in social institutions, as norms they guide our behavior to certain standards and ideals. Social phenomena and social values are interlocked and must be studied in their togetherness. A sociology which keeps itself aloof from value judgments forgets that goals and ideals are rooted in primary as well as in derivative human needs. Value-free social phenomena are nonexistent.

According to Mukerjee sociology has a twofold task: to describe and examine the stages and levels of valuation in their phenomenal occurrence, and to clarify the hierarchy of values, to appraise critically the goals and ideals which guide man's behavior. Both theoretical and evaluative sociology will lead to a "social engineer-

ing" which rests "on the proper scaling of values and the recognition of man's dignity, creativeness, and freedom of participation in the major values of life, and resists the use of fellowmen as pawns or as objects whose loyality and credulity are exploited for selfish ends" (p. xiv). Many contemporary sociologists will reject such normative judgments which abound in Mukerjee's book (especially in chapters I, II, XII, and XIV) as unscientific. The reviewer believes that a scientific appraisal of values can be made, provided we subscribe to the fundamental presupposition that survival and expansion of mankind are the ultimate ends we ought to strive for. Mukerjee seems to have such a postulate in mind when he talks about "self-status and self-enhancement." If we agree on that assumption, all goals and ideals can be appraised as to their instrumentality. By refusing to embark upon a criticism of values sociology does not become more scientific but remains incomplete. In addition, the "ethical neutrality" in which many scientists take pride becomes very often "loaded with static and fatalistic valuations in its hidden ethos" (p. vii).

It is beyond the scope of this short review to go into details of Mukerjee's book. Its rich content is informative and stimulating. Chapters II, IV, and V are full of verifiable data. Here Mukerjee discusses at length values as social emergents, the gradual diffusion and interpenetration of various values, their biological and cultural blending. The reader will find very interesting Mukerjee's classification of social groups in crowd, interest-association, society, and commonalty and their corresponding types of valuation. Chapter VI, "Laughter as the Social Gesture of Valuation," contains many original ideas. Mukerjee's explanation of the different functions of laughter, such as biological, economic, social, and spiritual is very convincing.

Mukerjee does not write as a cool spectator of human values and disvalues. He is motivated by the noble passion for better mankind. This bias does not blind him to the intricate difficulties of the value problem. He sees them very clearly, points out means and ways of attacking them vigorously. His approach displays a fine blend of empirical observation and an idealistic directness. This idealistic directness notwithstanding (or perhaps because of it), his book offers us a wealth of empirical data, so utterly neglected by those sociologists and economists who look upon values as scientific taboos.

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The Design of Democracy. LAURENCE STAPLETON. New York: Oxford University Press. 1949. 301 pp. $4.00.

We are engaged in a contest to win the assent of hostile and indifferent nations to the good of freedom and self-government, without which equality is meaningless. Our aims offer more to people and demand more from them. Our only risk of failure is that we should confine ourselves to a negative definition and use of these aims. Often, however, and we have observed it, when the future of democracy seems puzzling and discouraging, beyond our resources, a simple resolve takes place among the people and its direction is towards faith in themselves.

With these soberly optimistic words Professor Stapleton, who teaches English and Political Theory at Bryn Mawr, concludes her exploration of the contemporary meaning of democracy as we have come to understand it. Equality, freedom, and self-government are its leading themes, and no one of them is a simple matter. The documents which breathe the spirit of democracy are not most honored by being "confined in a streamlined Pullman, under guard." They rather deserve serious study in homes or libraries, followed by adventurous testing in the community. "Until every citizen is an honest politician some of the time, it will be hard to end the reign of the crooked ones." Yet we submit all too tamely to "the mountebank tricks of advertisers, of commentators seizing on conflict as an easy source of drama, and the taste for gossip and triviality which hinders us from learning more seriously the resources of human character" (pp. 137, 149, 159). Professor Stapleton devotes a single chapter each to the economic, the literary, the educational, and the religious aspects of democracy, contending in the latter that while "mere humanism" is "not enough" for religious purposes, there is no reason to credit the "dire forecasts" of political disaster should "materialism" or "secularism" (as defined by religionists) prevail (p. 208).

The thorny issue of democracy in international relations is considered in the two concluding chapters. "There is no principle of democracy," says the author, "that is not as valid internationally as nationally." But in the present clash of power-combines it is hardly enough to assert that, philosophically, the issue is not either "Capitalism *versus* Communism" or "the national interests of Western countries *versus* the Soviet Union," but rather "the integrity of the democratic process and the worth of the individual human being *versus* the totalitarian state." The trouble is that it is all these things, and more too. The author sees but two routes, roughly speaking, "to the goal of collective security under law. One is by strengthening the United Nations Charter. The other is by assembling within the Charter a smaller union composed of

those members who are willing to assume greater obligations towards each other than the Charter itself calls for." The United Nations as now constituted "is not strong enough, but it is the best we have, and we should use it to the hilt. Meanwhile two further steps are possible: open discussion by governments within the United Nations of a stronger union, and more adventurous efforts at conciliation with Russia" (pp. 233, 242, 251, 263). Professor Stapleton seldom troubles to raise questions in terms that are technically philosophical, but she has written a fluent compendium of contemporary Western democracy for the use of students who may wish an introduction both to its practical intricacies and to its essential temper.

H. A. L.

La mystique du surhomme. MICHEL CARROUGES. (Bibliothèque des Idées.) Paris: Librairie Gallimard. 1948. 436 pp. 650 frs.

This bulky volume is a detailed and exhaustive study of the philosophy, psychology, and symbolism of Promethean atheism in world literature by a Catholic scholar who is primarily concerned to show the utter failure of man's poetic attempts to deify himself. It is the story of "the War of the Divine Succession," with various authors endeavoring to make good Nietzsche's declaration that "the death of God is the condition *sine qua non* of the birth of superman." The book is chiefly instructive as a panorama of what happens when volatile human spirits give up old deities but refuse to renounce the demands which led to their original beliefs. They are the poets whose "impatience with limits" plunged them into mystical adventures in self-deification: Rimbaud, Baudelaire, Poe, Mallarmé, Lautréamont, and Kafka, among others. The author ransacks the literature of man's attempted conquest of heaven in order to underline its complete and Luciferian failure. What he leaves untouched is the non-theistic attitude which is patient enough with limits to avoid attempting to play the gaudy rôle of superman.

H. A. L.

NEW BOOKS AND CURRENT JOURNALS

Perspectives on a Troubled Decade. Science, Philosophy and Religion, 1939–1949. Tenth Symposium. Edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver. New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc. 1950. Distributed by Harper & Brothers, New York and London. xvii + 901 pp. $5.50.

Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp. (Hafner Library of Classics, Number Thirteen.) New York: Hafner Publishing Company. 1950. xii + 233 pp. $1.25 paper; $2.50 cloth.

Kaufmann, Walter A.: Nietzsche. Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1950. xi + 409 pp. $6.00.

Keith, Sir Arthur: An Autobiography. New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. xi + 721 pp. $4.75.

John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Method. Edited with an Introduction by Ernest Nagel. (The Hafner Library of Classics, Number Twelve.) New York: Hafner Publishing Company. 1950. l + 461 pp. $2.50 paper; $4.50 cloth.

Mondolfo, Rodolfo: Ensayos sobre el renacimiento italiano: Tucuman: Instituto de Filosofia. 1950. 60 pp.

Smith, Vincent Edward: Idea-Men of Today. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Bruce Publishing Company. 1950. x + 434 pp. $5.00.

Sorokin, Pitirim A.: Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis. Boston, Massachusetts: The Beacon Press. 1950. xi + 345 pp. $4.00.

The Teaching of Philosophy. The proceedings and addresses of the conference held at Western Reserve University, October 14–15, 1949. Edited by Frederick P. Harris. Cleveland, Ohio. 1950. v + 92 pp.

Problèmes de Philosophie des Sciences. Premier Symposium—Bruxelles 1947. VII. Vers une synthèse moderne du savoir. (Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles, 1109.) Archives de l'Institut International des Sciences Théoriques, Serie A. Paris: Hermann & Cie. 1950. 31 pp.

THE THOMIST. Vol. XIII, No. 2. Max Scheler and the Faith: *J. M. Oesterreicher.* Hope and Charity in St. Thomas: *P. De Letter.* Plato and the Poets: *J. A. Mourant.*

THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM. Vol. XXIV, No. 4. Farewell, Philosophy: *Pierre Conway* and *G. Q. Friel.* Professor Stace and the Principle of Causality: *F. X. Meehan.* The Existentialism of Etienne Gilson: *John Noonan.* Law in Aristotle and St. Thomas: *Walter Farrell.*

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN. Vol. XXVII, No. 4. The Universal Doubt in the Light of Descartes's Conception of Truth: *H. G. Wolz.* The Meaning of Some Quotations from St. Augustine in the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas: *Anton-Hermann Chroust.* The Nature and Genesis of the Skeptic Attitude (cont.): *Venant Cauchy.*

FILOSOFIA. Anno I, Fascicolo IV. Dialettica, storicismo, formalismo: *Enrico De Negri.* Ideali e princípi: *Augusto Guzzo.*

METHODOS. Vol. I, 3. Il linguaggio (with English translation): *Silvio Ceccato.* Die Konformationsregeln der empirischen Rechtswissenschaft (with English translation): *Fritz Paradies.* Fisica e metodologia (with English translation): *Vittorio Somenzi.* Zur Algebraik des Logikkalküls: *F. L. Bauer.* Sur le "De syllogismo hypothetico" de Boèce: *R. van den Driessche.* L'analyse de l'antinomie russellienne par Leśniewski: (suite): *Boleslaw Sobocinski.*

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. Anno XLII, Fasc. IV. Hegel critico di Kant: *S. Vanni Rovighi.* Per una interpretazione dell'estetica kantiana: *G. Vecchi.* Cartesio e il problema della metafisica: *C. Ferro.* A conclusione de una polemica: *F. Olgiati.* Lettera aperta a Mons. Olgiati: *A. Carlini.* I tre principî fondamentali della logica classica: *R. Gradi.*

RICERCHE FILOSOFICHE. Anno XVIII, Vol. III. Il problema dei criteri di valutazione e i suoi aspetti odierni: *Rodolfo De Stefano.* Sul problema del male: *Domenico Scoleri.* Primo passo verso un'analisi del dolore umano: *Dante Cicinato.* Discussioni intorno allo storicismo: *Francesco Valentini.*

PHILOSOPHISCHE JAHRBUCH. 60.Band, 2.und 3.Heft. Die Fuldaer Philosophentagung: *V. Rüfner.* Der Ursprung des Menshen: *H. Conrad-Martius.* Die Angst vor der Transzendenz: *G. Kafka.* Die neue Physik und das Problem de Induktion: *J. de Vries.* Der alte und der neue Heidegger: *Llambias de Azevedo.* Das Anliegen der Existenzphilosophie: *J. Hommes.* Ueber die Zeit: *E. Wasmuth.* Das Problem einer christlichen Philosophie: *R. Schwarz.* Goethes Weltbegriff: *F. Bergenthal.* Die Ueberwindung des Kantianismus: *G. Siegmund.* Der Mensch in seinem Dasein (Forts.): *G. Siegmund.* Die Illuminationstheorie bei Augustinus: *J. Fellermeier.* Quantenphysik und Metaphysik: *H. Straubinger.* Wilhelm Ockham und die Philosophie der Ordnungen: *Th. Barth.*

LES ETUDES PHILOSOPHIQUES. Nouvelle Série, No. 2. Numero Special consacré à Descartes. Descartes devant la pensée contemporaine: *J. Benda.* Pour un retour à Descartes: *G. Berger.* Descartes et la mort: *C. Devivaise.* Descartes et le style scientifique français: *P. Humbert.* Le rationalisme de Decartes: *P. Mesnard.* La réalité de l'etendue chez Descartes: *J. Moreau.* De la liberté chez Descartes: *R. Sarano.* La liberté divine et la liberté humaine, préclude cartésien à l'existentialisme: *J. Segond.* Discussion—Y-a-t-il de l'intellectualisme chez Bergson? *C. Husson.*

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LOUVAIN. Tome 48, No. 19. Le thomisme peut-il se présenter comme "Philosophie existentielle"?

Benoit Pruche. L'origine aristotélicienne de la "tertia via" de saint Thomas: *Henri Holstein.* La phénoménologie du corps: *Alphonse De Waelhens.* Deux écrits de jeunesse d'Aristote sur la doctrine des idées: *Suzanne Mansion.* A travers la littérature thomiste récente: *Fernand Van Steenberghen.* Un traité de l'existence morale: *Paul Decerf.*

RÉPERTOIRE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE. Tome II, No. 3.

ARCHIVIO DI FILOSOFIA. Il Solipsismo. Alterità e Comunicazione. Il solipsismo e l'analisi fenomenologica: *Enrico Castelli.* Une solitude ouverte sur tout l'univers: *Louis Lavelle.* Il sentiero: *Martin Heidegger.* Il solipsismo e le forme storiche della comunicazione: *Paolo Filiasi-Carcano.* L'assurdità del solipsismo: *Annibale Pastore.* Alterità e comunicazione nel pensiero di Gentile: *Vito A. Bellezza.* Un-aporia sofistica sulla comunicabilità del sapere e la sua risonanza platonica: *Manlio Buccellato.* Padova: Editoria Liviana. 1950. 147 pp. 1600 l.

REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA. I. 1950. (Published by the Facultad de Humanidade y Ciencias de la Educación, Instituto de Filosofia, Universidad Nacional de la Plata, Argentina.) La Idea de Dios en J. W. Goethe: *Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen.* La unidad del conocimiento humano: *Octavio Nicolás Derisi.* Arte y tragedia en Aristóteles: *R. M. Agoglia.* La situación histórica de Herder y las bases de su filosofía: *Emilio Estiú.* Conocimiento poetico y conocimiento filosofico: *Jose Maria de Estrada.*

We print below a list of selected articles from the following publications:

THE PERSONALIST. Volume XXXI, No. 4. Studies in American Personalism—II, Boston Personalism: *R. T. Flewelling.* Josiah Royce, California's Gift to Philosophy: *D. S. Robinson.* The Impasse between Philosophy and Theology: *J. F. Butler.*

THE HUMANIST. Vol. X, No. 2. Dr. Freud Says It's Compensation: *H. M. Kallen.* Existentialism is a Pessimistic Humanism: *Kenneth Patton.* (No. 5.) John Dewey's Humanism: Man Making Himself: *E. W. Strong.* Human Personality and the Cosmos: *Francisco Romero.*

THE BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. Volume I, Number 2. Metaphysical Interpretations of Science, Part II: *Philipp Frank.* Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and in Classical Physics, Part I: *K. R. Popper.* An Outline of General System Theory: *L. von Bertalanffy.*

THE KENYON REVIEW. Vol. XII, No. 2. Existentialism and the Self: *P. B. Rice.* Malraux's Aesthetic: *Kermit Lansner.* (No. 3.) Einstein's Philosophy of Science: *Ernest Nagel.* (No. 4.)

American Philosophy at Mid-Century: *A. E. Murphy.* The Politics of Human Power: *R. P. Blackmur.*

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL. Vol. XLVIII, No. 190. A Note on the Self and the Person: *C. I. Smith.* Lord Acton on Freedom and Conscience: *G. E. Fasnacht.* The Relevance of Pascal: *Harold Knight.* (Number 191.) The Mystery of the Family Bond: *Gabriel Marcel.* American Optimism and the Problem of the Good: *J. A. C. Fagginger Auer.* Miracles—The Philosophical Approach: *Patrick Nowell-Smith.* Is Reason Always Right? *John Nance.* Revelation without Content: *H. D. Lewis.* (Number 192.) Religion and the Rise of Western Culture: *Arnold Toynbee.* Have We Realized All That Evolution Implies? *G. N. M. Tyrrell.* Man without Mind? *F. H. Heinemann.* Karl Jaspers on Theology and Philosophy: *R. Gregor Smith.* Survey of Recent Philosophical and Theological Literature: *F. H. Heinemann* and *E. L. Allen.*

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW. Volume XLIII, Number 3. The Seventeenth Century Doctrine of Plastic Nature: *W. B. Hunter.*

THOUGHT. Volume XXV, Number 96. Philosophical Pluralism and Catholic Orthodoxy: *R. F. Harvanek.* Précis on Evolution: *J. F. Ewing.* (Number 97.) The Basis of a Philosophical Anthropology: *R. C. Pollock.* A Comment on Philosophical Systems: *M. C. D'Arcy.* (Number 98.) Nature, History and Poetry: *W. H. Auden.* The Problem of Symbolism: *Jean Daniélou.* Culture and Belief: *W. F. Lynch.*

REVUE DE THÉOLOGIE ET DE PHILOSOPHIE. No. 154. Existence et rationalité: *F. L. Mueller.*

REVISTA NACIONAL DE CULTURA. Año X, No. 75. Heráclito y cristianismo: *I. Bentata.* José Luis Ramos: Un humanista venezolano: *E. Arroyo Alverez.* (No. 76.) La intuición en la ciencia y en el arte: *Edoardo Crema.*

SAPIENTIA. Año V, Núm. 17. La nueva orientación filosófica del Brasil: *Evaldo Pauli.* El problema moral: *Carlo Giacon.*

EPISTEME. Año III, Núm. 7. Aspectos epistemológicos de la teoría de las ecuaciones diferenciales: *Carlos Biggeri.* La noción de serie: *Armando Asti Vera.* El problema estético: *A. E. Roland.*

SYNTHESE. Volume VII, No. 6-A. (This number is dedicated to Professeur Robert Feys on his sixtieth birthday.) Development of the Notion of Set and of the Axioms for Sets: *Alfons Borgers.* A Simplification of the Theory of Combinators: *Haskell B. Curry.* Logique et théories physiques: *P. Destouches-Février.* Intervention d'une logique de modalité dans une théorie physique: *J. L. Destouches.* Der Begriff der Funktion in der symbolischen Logik: *Karl Dürr.* A New Definition of Truth: *J. C. C. McKinsey.* The

Nature of Logic: *A. G. M. van Melsen.* On Decidability and Completeness: *W. V. Quine.*

ARCHIV FÜR PHILOSOPHIE. 3/4. Zur Philosophie Husserls: *T. W. Adorno.* Die Philosophie des Nicolaus v. Cues. Eine Vorform der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik: *Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck.* Die Situation der Historie und Max Webers Methodenlehre: *Dieter Henrich.* Grundsätzliches zu Gohlkes Aristotelesübersetzung: *Ulrich Fleischer.*

ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE EN PSYCHOLOGIE. 42e jaargang, Aflevering 3. Descartes' geestelijke erfenis: *H. J. Pos.* Descartes en de Metaphysiek: *H. Robbers.* Descartes als mathematicus: *H. J. E. Beth.* Descartes et ses premiers disciples hollandais: *Paul Dibon.* Descartes en het Nederlands Cartesianisme: *C. L. Thijssen-Schoute.*

SCIENTIA. Vol. LXXXV, N. CDLX–XI and Vol. LXXXV, N. CDLXII. Le costanti universali: *A. Carrelli.*

We have received the following reprints:

"The Principles of Creation in Art" by Susanne K. Langer, *The Hudson Review,* Winter, 1950, pp. 515–534.

"The Primary Illusions and The Great Order of Art" by Susanne K. Langer, *The Hudson Review,* Summer, 1950, pp. 219–233.

"The Deepening Mind: 50 Years of American Philosophy" by Susanne K. Langer and Eugene T. Gadol, *The American Quarterly,* Vol. II, pp. 118–132.

"Alexander the Great or Antiphon the Sophist? by Philip Merlan, *Classical Philology,* Vol. XLV (1950), pp. 161–166.

"The Limits of Skepticism in History" by Lewis White Beck, *The South Atlantic Quarterly,* Vol. 49 (1950), pp. 461–468.

NOTES AND NEWS

We learn with regret of the death of John Elof Boodin, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at University of California at Los Angeles, on November 14, 1950, in Los Angeles, California. His age was 81.

We learn with regret of the death of Charles Bruce Vibbert, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Michigan and former director of the American University Union, on November 18, 1950, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, at the age of 73.

The annual meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, in conjunction with Section L of the American Association for the

Advancement of Science, will be held on December 29 and 30, 1950, at Cleveland Public Auditorium, Cleveland, Ohio. The following papers will be read:

"Some Philosophical Aspects of the Second Law of Thermodynamics" by *Walter Kahoe;* "Covariance and Timeless Laws" by *Erwin Biser;* "Scientific Method and Psychoanalysis" by *Murray Wax;* "Methodological Issues in Recent Studies of National Character" by *Milton Singer* and *Margaret Mead;* "Logic and the Laws of Nature" by *Julius Weinberg* and *Thomas F. Storer.*

The Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences will be held at the New School for Social Research, New York, November 26, 1950. The morning session will be devoted to the subject "Descartes after 300 Years" with the following papers: "Cartesian Thought and the History of Science" by George Sarton; "Descartes and Logic" by Paul Schrecker. The afternoon session will be on "Fundamental Problems in Mathematics," with the following papers: "Mathematical Entities" by Willard V. Quine; "The Actual Infinite as a Tool of Thought" by Ervand J. Kogbetliantz.

The Mountain-Plains Philosophical Conference unanimously passed the following resolution at its Fourth Annual Meeting in Denver, Oct. 14:

"Be it resolved that the Mountain-Plains Philosophical Conference express its emphatic disapproval of the action of the Regents of the University of California in dismissing numerous members of its Faculty on grounds incompatible with essential principles of academic freedom and responsibility, and with the traditional self-government of university faculties as regulated by these principles.

We recognize and deplore the injury that has been done to individual teachers and scholars, among them our own respected colleague, Prof. Jacob Loewenberg. More importantly by far, we recognize in the action protested a major attack upon essential preconditions of university life throughout the Nation.

Be it resolved further, therefore, that we offer full support to the Faculty of the University of California, in action it may take to restore that full measure of individual liberty and collective responsibility without which no university can function as a creative center of scholarship and education."

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VOLUME XLVII

Number 19. September 14, 1950.

What Is the Philosophic Problem? JACK KAMINSKY.

Review of William Kneale's *Probability and Induction* by ERNEST NAGEL.

Review of Hans Reichenbach's *The Theory of Probability* by ERNEST NAGEL.

Number 20. September 28, 1950.

The Value-Theory of C. I. Lewis. LESTER MECKLER.

Comments and Criticism. Are There Synthetic *A Priori* Truths? WILLIAM E. FELCH.

Number 21. October 12, 1950.

Terminal and Adjectival Values. ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

Number 22. October 26, 1950.

Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis. W. V. QUINE.

Comments and Criticism. Gödel and the Synthetic *A Priori*. IRVING M. COPI.

Review of C. E. M. Joad's *Decadence. A Philosophical Inquiry* by CHARLES FRANKEL.

Number 23. November 9, 1950.

Hedonism, Conflict, and Cruelty. GARDNER WILLIAMS.

Comments and Criticism. Poetry and Emotive Meaning. MARGUERITE H. FOSTER.

Review of E. F. Carritt's *Ethical and Political Thinking* by ABRAHAM EDEL.

Review of Philipp Frank's *Modern Science and its Philosophy*, and Philipp Frank's *Relativity: A Richer Truth* by H. T. COSTELLO.

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